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THE MILITARY POST AS A FACTOR IN THE 
FRONTIER DEFENSE OF KANSAS, 1865-1869 
1. 
The name "fort" is perhaps~ misnomer when applied to 
the military poets of the western frontier during the six-
ties. No huge, grim structure of defense, which usually is 
associated with the name fort, was ever erected on the 
western border. Nor did the western fort usually possess a 
stookade or blookhouse for defensive purposes. Officers• 
quarters, soldiers' barracks, stables, military storehouses 
and headquarters buildings, grouped around a trim parade 
ground. constituted the frontier fort. While no doubt a 
disappointment to many of its critics the military post of 
the Middle West admirably fulfilled the purposes for which 
it was constructed, 1· !•, the keeping open of lines of 
travel and oommunioation and the protection of outlying 
settlements. 
Forte were located without any definite prearranged 
plan. A military necessity for a post at a certain point 
l 
determined that the post should be there established. 
Dur1ll8 the Civil War and in the period immediately follow-
ing, increased Indian activity on the plains caused an 
expansion in the total number of frontier posts. In 1860 
2. 
there were seventy-three army posts on the frontier, four 
1ocated in Kansas. These forts had an average garrison ot 
190 men. By 1864 the number of forts had increased to 101. 
Kansas, in the meantime, had had its quota raised to five. 
In 1867 the American frontier possessed 116 poets with an 
average of 212 men per post. This was the high mark in 
frontier garrisons. By 1870 the number of posts had de-
2 
creased to 111 with an average garrison of 205 men. 
Army forts were of two types: The permanent fort, and 
the temporary outpost or camp. The former was built as a 
definite protection to some route of travel or oommunioation 
and was in service for years, whereas the latter usually 
~'Vas operated for only a few weeks or months as military 
needs determined. 
Nearly all the ~ermanent military establishments within 
the State of Kansas were built to serve as guardians of the 
great highways to Colorado and New Mexico. The Santa Fe 
Trail was defended by three of these: Forts Zarah, Larned 
and Dodge; while Forts Riley, Harker, Hays and Wallace 
stood guard over the Smoky Hill route to Denver. Fort 
Leavenworth. father of all the Kansas military posts, stood 
at the head of both these famous trails, in addition to 
being connected with the Platte Trail to California and 
Oregon. Of the major forts, Fort Scott alone remained aloof 
from the busy thoroughfares to the West. 
Kansas was defended during the sixties by two types of 
3. 
forts: the United States army posts of both classes, gar-
risoned by army regulara, and the looal defensive fort. 
whioh spraJl8 up to meet some sectional emergency and was 
usually garrisoned by state militia, although sometimes 
merely by local settlers. A map of Kansas in 1868 indica-
ted eight United States army posts within the boundaries of 
3
the State. A ninth, Fort Wallace, was also in service al-
though not shown on the map. The following United states 
army poets were denoted: Fort Leavenworth in Leavenworth 
County, Fort Scott in Bourbon County, Fort Riley in Riley 
County (now in Geary County), Fort ~'llsworth (Rarker).in 
Ellsworth County, b~rt Zarah in Barton County, Fort Larned 
in Pawnee County, Fort Hays in Ellis County and Downers 
Station in Trego County. The last was a temporary outpost; 
the first seven were permanent structures. 
To give a clear notion of the extent of frontier de-
fense in pioneer Kansas it is necessary to do more than 
merely name the United States army posts. To do Justice to 
the subJeot not only must each of these major military de-
fenses be located and a brief history of each given, but 
mention must be made of the more important temporary camps 
or stations of the regular army as well as the local fort-
ressos ot the settlers. It would also be illogical to over-
look those army posts located adjacent to but outside of 
Kansas. These materially aided' in the State's defense. The 
followi?J8 study, therefore,_will concern itself with each 
4. 
class of fortifications in the order named: (l) Permanent 
United States army forts in Kansas; (2) temporary United 
States army camps or stations in Kansas; (3) local defen-
sive forts in Kansas; (4') permanent United states army 
forts adJaoent to, but outside of Kansas. 
Fort Leavenworth was the first permanent United States 
army fort established in Kansas. It was founded by Colonel 
Henry Leavenworth in 1827. From that date until well in 
the 70'e this tort on the Missouri served as the chief unit 
in the system of frontier defense. In the fifties and six-
ties it was the general depot from which supplies were sent 
to all the United States military poets. camps and forte in 
4
the Great West. Here the military commanders of the de»art-
ment of Missouri. of which Kansas was a part, made their 
headquarters. With only a few exceptions Leavenworth re-
mained the department headquarters. When neoessity demanded 
the department commander shifted to the other forts within 
his department. For example, General Sheridan moved his 
headquarters to b"rt Hays in 1868 and later to Camp supply 
in Indian·Territory. During the winter of 1869-1870 General 
Schofield was forced to remove the department offices to 
st. Louis in order to make room at Fort Leavenworth for the 
Seventh Cavalry, which had been on the plains the previous 
year. 5 The importance of Fort Leavenworth is demonatrated by
the fact that General Sterling Price made it one of the 
obJectives in his famous raid of 1864. 
Fort Soott was established four miles west of the 
Missouri line in east central Kansas in 1842. Beca~se. of 
its location it never was a factor in the frontier defense 
of the State against the Indians in the sixties; although 
for a short time in 1866 garrisons stationed in the town 
patrolled the eastern border of the State as a protection 
6
against possible bushwhaoker invasion from Missouri. 
Fort Riley was established in 1853 on the north bank 
5. 
of the Kansas river at the Junction of the Smoky 1!111 and 
Republican forks. S1noe it was closer to the area of Indian· 
troubles it soon became the point of departure for most of 
7.
the mounted expeditions against the hostile tribes. During 
' ', '
the great Indian ware of the sixties, however, the forts 
farther to the west and south became the starting points for 
expeditions against the Indians. Fort Riley's chief func-
tion during that period became one of organizing and drill-
ing troops and as headquarters for military supplies. Here 
the famous seventh Cavalry was organized in the fall of 
1866. The fort held a unique posit~on in the military. 
organization of the nation, being listed in army records as 
8
an independent post. 
Of the guardians of the santa Fe trail in Kansas during 
the sixties, Fort Larned was the oldest and most important. 
Established in 1859 as the "Camp on Pawnee Fork", its history 
dates back further than that of either Forts Dodge or Zarah. 
On February 1, 1860, the place was rechristened camp Alert, 
&. 
and later in the year received its permanent name, Fort 
Larned. The fort was.located on the bank of the Pawnee Fork 
about eight miles west of its Junction with the Arkansas 
River .near the present town o:f Larned. Fort La.rned's prin-
cipal usefulness was as a headquarters for military forces 
detailed to guard traffic along the trail. It also served 
as an agency and gathering place for t.he plains tribes. 
When a rumor reached Kansas in 18?2 that General Pope pro-
posed to disoontinue Fort Larned as a military post Governor 
Harvey protested vigorously, stating that the people of 
South-central Kansas, and especially the workmen el18aged in 
constructing the Santa Fe Railroad, needed the fort ae a 
9
protection against the Indians. Aooordingly the tort was 
not abandoned until 18?8. 
Fort Zarah, located northeast of Fort Larned on Walnut 
Creek about one mile from its confluence with the Arkansas, 
was established by Generals. R. Curtis in 1864 and named in 
10 
honor of his son. Fort Zarah aided materially in the guard-
ing of the Santa Fe Trail, esoorts being constantly employed 
to accompany trains west to Smoky Crossing between Zarah and 
ll 
Larned and east for twenty-five miles toward Council Grove. 
12 
The post was abandoned in December, 1869. 
•
Fort Dodge, the most westerly of the big forts along 
the Trail in Kansas, was established in 1864 by llaJor Gen-
eral Grenville u. Dodge. The post was near the 1nterseot1on 
of the dry and wet routes of the Santa Fe Trail. It lay 
7, 
between the two points where the Indians most frequently 
crossed the Arkansas--the Cimarron Crossing, twenty-five 
miles west, and Mulberry Creek Crossing, fifteen miles east. 
It attained its greatest importance during the latter part 
of 1868, ·When it was used for a time by General Sheridan as 
headquarters tor his famous winter campaign against the 
13 
Ind1~ne 1n Indian Territory and Texas. 
That the locality near Fort Dodge was of strategic 
importance in guarding the Trail is evidenced by.the fact 
tho.t several other forts :preceded it in the region. The 
earliest of these was Fort Mann, established in 1845 near 
14 
the Cimarron Crossing and abandoned in 1850. While Fort 
Wann ,vas in its prime another post called Fort Ha.c~.e.y was 
located farther to the east. The exact date of its estab-
lishment and abandonment are unknown. In 1850 Fort Atkinson 
15 
was established, and was abandoned in 1854. It was near the 
site of Fort Atkinson that Fort Dodge was later established. 
In 1864 and 1865 a chain of forts extended along the 
Smoky Hill Valley through which ran the Butterfield Overland 
Diopatoh trom Leavenworth and Atchison to Denver. Forts 
Harker, Wallace and Hays were built in the order named to 
guard this short out to Denver whioh passed through the most 
Indian-infested region in Kansas. 
Fort Harker, originally Fort Ellsworth, was built in 
1864 near the present town of Ellsworth, thirty-six miles 
a. 
west of Salina. It was located on the Smoky Hill River at 
16 
the crossing of the old Santa Fe stage Road. A brief des-
cription of it is given by the traveler, Bell, who refers to 
it as a "well-built, three-company post, with spacious 
store-houses filled with munitions of war", but like all 
these military establishments, carrying out in no particular 
17 
the term fort. 
During its active career of nine years Fort Harker 
proved to be a bulwark of defense against the hostile In-
dians. It was one of the strongest, if not the stro?JBest, 
of the western Kansas forts and effectively proteoted the 
18 
town of Salina from Indian incursions. When General Polk, 
commander of the Department of the Missouri• was considering 
the abandonment of Fort Harker in 1871, the Kansas legisla-
ture on February 16, passed a Joint resolution of protest to 
the government. The legislature gave as reasons, first that 
Fort Harker was essential to the defense of the North-
central Kansas frontier, and second, that it would be a 
great financial loss, since the buildings cost the United 
States $1,000,000 and would sell under the hammer for about 
19 
$25,000. The government finally abandoned the Fort in 1873. 
Forts Hays and Wallace came into existence at approxi-
mately the same time, Wallace being constructed in September 
while Hays was established in October of 1866. 
Fort Ha.ye was known as Fort b1etoher until November 11, 
9. 
1866. It was located on the line of the proposed Kansas 
Paoific Railroad near the site of the present city of Hays. 
Like all the forts on the Kansas Pacific line, Raye contrib-
uted much toward protecting construction camps along the 
road and keep1Il8 open the Smoky Hill route. In the Indian 
wars of 1867 it was headquarters for General Hancock during 
part of his campaign. Again in 1868 General Sheridan made 
20 
Fort Rays the headquarters for hie campaign. This honor 
must be shared, however, with E'ort Dodge and Camp Supply. 
The famous seventh Cavalry, under Colonel George A. Custer, 
was quartered at Hays from 1867 to 1870, and the Nineteenth 
21 
Kansas Cavalry was mustered-out there in the spring of 1869. 
The Fort was abandoned by the government in 1889. 
Fort Wallace was first called Camp Pond Creek. It was 
looated near the western boundary of Kansas on Pond Creek, a 
tributary to the Smoky Hill. Wallace was the la~t and most 
western military post of any permanency in Kansas. From 
1865 to 1878 it bore the brunt of the contest with the 
22 
Indian tribes. Its tu.notions were similar to those of Forts 
Hays and Harker, with the exception that the latter were 
larger and were more often seleoted as headquarters for 
large expeditions against the Indians. That Fort Wallace 
was unusually active in frontier protection cannot be doubt-
ed, however. There is little evidence to refute the follow-
ill8 statement concerning the importance of the Fort: 
"It is very evident after checking up the 
assignements of troops and engagements between 
the Indians and the military in Kansas, that the 
small garrisons at Fort Wallaoe participated in 
more actual engagements with the Indians and 
were sent to the relief of more scout and escort 
parties than the soldiers from any other post in 
Kansas. Other posts were bases ot supplies and 
regimental headquarters where large foraea were 
mobilized for Indian campaigns. But none defen-
ded a larger territory on the western frontier 
, 23 
of Kansas .• ·" 
. 10. 
Garrisons at Fort Wallace were usually low during the 
Indian wars of 1866-'69, since troops were constantly acting 
as escorts for railroad surveyors and laborers, stage coach-
es, wagon trains, and for government officials and quartor-
24 
masters trains. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these forts comprised the 
backbone of the frontier defense in Kansas they were ably 
assisted by smaller outposts and camps of a temporary nature. 
Among those graced with the dignity of the term "fort" were 
the posts of Aubrey, Downer, Monument, Ogallah, Kirwin and 
Lookout. Of the camps the most prominent was camp ~eeoher. 
Fort Aubrey was built to aid in the defense of the 
Santa Fe Trail during the Indian war of 1866. Its location 
was sixteen miles west of Choteau•s island on the Arkansas 
ll. 
River iu1d approximately one hundred miles west of Fort DodBe
by the wagon road and fifty miles east of Jlort Lyon. Colo-
rado. The site of the Fort is four miles east of the present 
town of Syracuse. Kansas. Fort Aubrey was established by
Companies D and F of the Forty-eighth Wisconsin Volunteer 
25 
Infantry in September, 1865. The Fort was abandoned April 
15. 1866, during a lull in Indian activities along the Old 
Trail. 
Fort Downer, an outpost on the Smoky Hill route to the 
Colorado gold fields, was located about fifty miles west of 
Fort Maye in Trego County. It was established as a stage 
26 
station 1n 1865 and was a military post in 1867- 168. The 
place was abandoned May 28, 1868. The post was used by
General Custer as a base for Indian operations in Trego 
County in 186?. An eating station of the Butterfield Over-
land Dispatch, located at this point, was burned in 1867 by 
27 
hostiles. 
Fort Monument, or Fort Pyramid, was another outpost 
which was short lived. It was established in 1866.and aban-
doned in 1868. The Post was constructed in Gove County on 
the route of the Kansas Pacific Railroad between Forts Hays 
and Wallace near some monument-shaped rooks which gave the 
station its name. Although originally merely a station on 
the Butterfield Overland Dispatch it was soon found neoes-
sary to station troops there as a protection to the stage 
road. General Dodge in 1866 placed soldiers at this point 
12. 
simultaneous with the garrisoning of Big Cre·ek. Pond Creek, 
28 
and other·B. o. D. Stations. 
Trego County boasted of ano·ther defense besides Fort 
Downer. Camp Ogallah, on the Kansas Paoific Railroad about 
one mile west of Wakeeney. came into existence in 1867 or 
1868. It protected the railroad builders during a most 
29 
heotio period of Indian depredations. Aooording to one 
pioneer's version the camp's name was taken from the expres-
sion "O Golly"! A better explanation is that early settlers 
corrupted or mispronounced the name of the famous Ogallala 
30 
band of Dakota Indiana and applied it to the Fort. 
Camp·Beeoher, located in June, 1868, at the Junction ot 
the·Little Arkansas and Big Arkansas Rivers, was a new unit 
in the defensive chain of forts in Kansas. It was built 
following the great Indian scare of 1868, when the Cheyennes 
raided the east-central portion of the State. The primary 
purpose of Camp Beecher was as headquarters for a border 
31 
cavalry pat~ol which extended northward to Marion Center. 
During the Sheridan winter campaign of 1868-69 against the 
Indians, Camp Beecher was used as a supply station by the 
Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry. The Camp was abandoned in Octo-
ber, 1869. Even as early as 1868 the oamp site was referred 
32 
to as Wichita. 
Somewhat different from that of other forts in Kansas 
is the history of Fort Kirwin. Built to meet the necessity 
13. 
of frontier defense, it failed to meet that need and conse-
quently was abandoned. The Fort was established in 1865,by 
Colonel Kirwin and a company of Tennessee volunteers who 
were sent to proteot the Kansas fro11tier. The site chosen 
wns near the confluence of Bow Creek with the liol'th Solomon 
River in what is now Phillips County. Colonel John Kirwin, 
its builder, finding the country swarming with the hostile 
Indians, Judiciously decided to vacate. There were no set-
tlers needing protection within one hundred miles of the 
33 
Fort. 
Another of the lesser fortifications was Fort Lookout, 
in nepublio County. Situated upon a high b;utf commanding 
tho Republican River Valley, it guarded the military road 
from Fort Riley to Fort Kearney, Nebraska.· ·unlike the large 
military posts, it was oons~ructed in.the form of a .block-
house. This sturdy two-story log , st:r;-ucture: perfo1·med regu-
lar duty before 1868, when it was abandoned by·the regular 
army. State militia. used the building duril16 the Indian war 
of 1868. Following their withdrawal the old Fort·was used 
as a rendezvous for settlers of the White Rook and Republi-
34
can Valleys during the Indian scares of the early 70's. 
Pioneer Kansas was well supplied with local fortifica-
tions to which the settlers could fly for refuge during the 
numerous Indian raids and scares of the 60's. Included in 
this group were Fort Montgomery at Eureka, Fort Brooks in 
Cloud County, Fort Solomon in Ottawa County, Fort Camp Jewell 
on the site of present Jewell City, and two forts, names 
unknown, located in Mitchell and Republican Counties respec-
tively .. 
At the beginning of the Civil War citizens of the 
Eureka neighborhood constructed Fort Montgomery as a tort 
tor home guards. When they disbanded at the close of the 
War the Fort was occupied by a detachment of the Fifteenth 
35 
Kansas Cavalry. During the Indian soares of 1864-1869 it 
was used as a rallying place for settlers of Greenwood 
County. 
Enterprising militia of Shirley County, later Cloud 
County, constructed Fort Brooks in AU8ust or September, 
1864. Situated on the left bank of the Republican River the 
log blockhouse was headquarters for the local militia en-
36 
gaged in frontier defense. 
Fort Solomon in Ottawa County was a true frontier blook 
house. Built early in 1864 as a defense against the Indiana, 
. it was the only shelter for the maJority of the people ot 
Ottawa County from the summer of 1864 to the spring of 1865. 
It consisted of log houses, arranged in the form of n square 
and enclosed with palisades. Fortunately for the settlers 
':37 
-they were never forced to undergo a seige by Indians. 
Home Guards of Jewell County were responsible tor the 
construction of a sod tort in 1870 as a protection against 
the Indian raids• \'lhile Republic County in 1869 and Mi tohell 
15. 
County in 1867 each constructed an Indian defense. In Y.ay, 
1869, nearly all the settlers on Salt and Reily Creeks, in 
the Republican River region, left their claims and took 
ref\188 in a log fort in Belleville Township until a small 
38 
body of militia. was sent to their a.id. The Mitchell County 
Fort was built by settlers in 186'7 during the period of 
great Indian activity in Northwestern Kansas. Indian scares 
during that year greatly retarded immigration into the 
39 
County. 
In harmony with the home-guard movement during the 
Civil War, the state. capital buil·t a wooden stockade at the 
intersection of Sixth and Kansas Avenues. AlthoUgll intended 
as a place of refuge against guerrillas, it was never forced 
to defend Topeka from invaders. Christened with the en-
lightening title of Fort Simple, its existence was never 
complex from its birth in 1863 to its final destruction by
Topeknns a.f'ter the Civi1 We.r. 
Kansas was not entirely defended by forts within her 
own boundaries. Since the Plains Indian roamed unwittingly 
over the state boundary lines it frequently happened that 
Indian depredations were broken up by·soldiers stationed in 
the torte of the adJacent territories of Nebraska and Colo-
rado. 
Of these frontier watch dogs, Fort Kearney, Uebraska, 
was the most prominent. Located on the Platte River in 
16. 
Southern Nebraska its jurisdiction often extended into 
40 ~ 
Northern Kansas. From the time of its foundill8 in 1848 this 
fort on the Platte Trail was the headquarters for nearly all 
41 
military operations in Nebraska. 
Forte Cottonwood and Sedgwiok also defended the Platte 
Trail and contributed to the defense of Kansas. The £ormer, 
located at Cottonwood Springs, one hundred miles west or 
Fort Kearney, on the south bank of the Platte, proved ot 
valuable assistance in keeping overland traffic going during 
42
the Indian raids of 1864. Two years later the ~ort•s name 
was changed to McPherson. During the grand trek to the 
western mining country, Cottonwood Springs was an important 
43
supply depot for the miners. 
Farther west on the Platte Trail, near Julesburg, Colo-
rado, was a sod fort named Fort Dea.swick. It, too., was an 
important point since it was a depot of government supplies 
tor a region extending fully one hundred and fifty miles 
44 
along the South Platte. 
South of Fort Sedgwick, on the Arkansas River, a,tood 
Fort Lyon. It was situated on the Santa Fe ~rail about one 
hundred and fifty miles west of Fort Dodge. Known first as 
Bent's New Fort, from the time of its building in l8b3 until 
1869 when it was leased to the government, it later adopted 
4fi
the title of Fort Wise and finally, in 1861, Fort Lyon. 
When it became necessary to relocate the Fort in 1867, it 
was renamed New Fort Lyon. In 1890, by act of congress, 
l'l. 
the Fort was abandoned. The site of New Fort Lyon is.near 
the present town of Las Animas, Colorado. Although prin-
oipally engaged in protecting commerce and travel on the 
Santa Fe Trail, the troops of Fort Lyon participated in 
numerous Indian campaigns, chiefly that of Sheridan into 
Indian Territory in 1868-'69. Particularly fitting is the 
observation of a prominent traveler of the period concerning 
the military forte of the ~'ront1er. 
"Along the main lines ot travel throughout 
the whole western country, at distances from 
sixty to three hundred miles apart, the United 
. States government are obliged to maintain a 
great number of these military establishments 
••• In many instances not a white man lives 
in the intervening country, and yet without 
.46
them overland travel would be impossible." 
A brief explanation of the military organization of the 
r~iddle West following the Civil war will help to an under-
standing of references to posts and commanders. 
The United States was divided into military divisions 
commanded by major generals of the army. The Middle west 
belonged to the military division of the Missouri, which was 
organized in 1865 by the war Department,to include the 
states of Kansas, 1aissouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Illinois and the territories of Nebraska, Dakota, and Mon-
fana. Headquarters of the division was variously located at 
18. 
st. Louis, Chicago, Omaha and Fort Leavenworth. The divi• 
sion was subdivided at the time of its organization into 
four geographical departments of the Dakota, the Platte, the 
Missouri, and the Arkansas. 
The third of these, the Department of the Missouri, 
maintained permanent headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. This 
department was subdivided into four districts: the District 
of Kansas with headquarters also at Fort Leavenworth; the 
District of the Upper Arkansas whose headquarters was Fort 
Harker; the District of New Mexico, headquarters at Santa 
Fe; and the District of the Indian Territory, with head-
47
quarters at Fort Gibson. Of these districts in the Depart-
ment of the Missouri, the Diatriot of the u»per Arkansas was 
of the most interest to Kansans. Within its limits were 
Forts Dodge, Larned, Zarah, Wallace, Hays, Harker, and Lyons. 
Downer's Station. Monument Station and "End-of-Track", Union 
48 
Pacific, Eastern Division, were also included. 
From 1865 to 1869 the military division or the Missouri 
was commanded by Generals Pope, Sherman and Sheridan. in the 
order named. Department commanders changed even more fre-
quently. The Department of the Missouri during this period 
was in charge of Generals Dodge in 1865-'66, Hancock in 
1866-'67, Sheridan in 1868-'69 and Schofield in 1869. Prior 
to the organization of the military division of the Missouri. 
the state of.Kansas made up three- districts of the Department 
49
of Y..ansas under the command ot Generals. R. Curtis. 
19. 
In addition to the national military organization each 
state had its geographical departments for militia organiza-
tion. Under a legislative act of February 13, 1866, Kansas 
was divided into four brigade districts with a brigadier 
general of militia in command of each district. The entire 
militia was then under the supervision of a maJor general 
commanding. General w. F. Cloud, of Leavenworth City, acted 
in the capacity of state commander from 1865-'6?, when he 
was succeeded by General Harrison Kelley. 
20. 
CHAPTER II 
KANSAS AND THE BUSHWHACKERS 
Guerrilla warfare, which menaced nearly every region in 
the Border States during the Civil War, was a oonetant danger 
to the young state of Kansas. This type of warfare was not 
a new experience to the citizens of the state, however. 
Buahwhaoking had been going on intermittently ever sinoe 
1854. During the war it reached its peak, followed by a 
gradual decline in the ensuing years. Nevertheless, the 
tear oreated_by bushwhacking marauders lingered on after 
l 
their greatest activities had ceased. 
Awful as the Quantrill raid on Lawrence actually was, 
the rea1ity was no worse than the imaginary picture of fut-
. ure guerrilla incursions which was built up in the minds of 
the citizens of Kansas. Fear of Quantrill was responsible . 
to a large extent for the development of the Kansas militia 
during the Civil War. It also was the cause tor the spring-
ing up of numerous blockhouses and forts in the eastern part 
of the State. Fear and hatred of Quantrill motivated Gover-
nor Crawford of Kansas in ·seeking the arreut of the famous 
8
outlaw five years after his crime was· committed. 
Bushwhacker depredations in Kansas burst forth again in 
1864, culminating in the guerrilla outragds following the 
21. 
Price Raid. As early as February of that year rumors began 
to spread oonoerning the presence of bushwhackers in Eastern 
Kansas. On February 27, General Curtis, commander of the 
Department of the Missouri at Fort Leavenworth, wrote to 
Governor Carney warning him that Dick Yager and five compan-
3
ions had gone west to attack the Santa b'e Trail. Scouts had 
reported that Yager, a notorious guerrilla chieftain, had 
been seen south of Lawrence. General Curtis recommended 
that the Kansas militia be put on its guard and stated that 
he would order the United States officer in command at Law-
rence to "look after the rascals". Curtis also requested 
Carney to use his influence at Washington to bring about a 
strengthening of United states forces along the Eastern Kan-
sas border. 
During June and July, Kansas :papera were full of' news 
items in reference to conflicts between the military and the 
buehwhaokera. Early in June, Colonel Blair, commanding at 
Fort Soott, received a notice of the presence of a nest of 
outlaws near Spring Hiver. They were described as being 
4
half-breed Cherokees attired in Federal uniforms. In July 
occurred Colonel Ford's bushwhacker hunt in Missouri. The 
Colonel had been ordered forth from b'ort Leavenworth to 
break up a band of guerrillas under the command of a certain 
Thornton. Ford succeeded in defeating Thornton and disin-
tegrating his forces. Camden Point, a secession center in 
Platte County, Missouri was burned by the Union troops. 
22. 
Another interesting newspaper item of 1864 related that 
many of the Indians who had been operating in the vicinity 
of Fort Larned had sand~ colored hair and were apparently 
5
bushwhackers in disguise. This story is typical of nwnorous 
rumors which flew about Kansas during the Indian Wars of 
1864-1869. Although Kansans constantly asserted that the 
Indians were being led by bushwhackers, there is little 
proof for such statements. It is possible that the few 
half-breeds who associated with the plains Indians were mis-
taken for Missouri desperadoes by their fr1Bhtened viotims. 
In the fall of 1864, sterling ~rice with hie army ot 
raiders invaded Missouri and threatened ];astern Kansas. 
Price recruited many guerrillas to bolster up his small army 
of regulars, having between two and three thousand volun-
6
teers and bushwhackers in his ranks. Following his defeat 
at wes·tport and subsequent retreat into Arkansas, bushwhack-
ing members of his army spread a reign of terror throUBhout 
Western Missouri. Although the majority of their work was 
done in Missouri, the guerrillas succeeded in engulfine 
Eastern Kansas in a paralysis of fear. While no doubt imag-
ination distorted the actual danger, the fact remains that 
small bands of desperadoes were roaming in the region making 
life miserable for honest citizens whether of Union or Con-
federate faith. The presence of a strong guard of United 
States troops along the Kansas border effectually prevented 
the bushwhackers from entering the State in any large nwn-
bers. Numerous Kansas militia, called out to repel Price 
23. 
also aided in the defense against marauders. 
State militia having been disbanded and many army regu-
lars having been withdrawn from the eastern frontier, the 
spring of 1865 brought forth a renewed clamor for protection. 
John Speer, owner of the Kansas Daill Tribune (Lawrence), 
put on an editorial campaign urging additional defense for 
7 
the eastern border. In an article entitled «protection for 
Kansas", Mr. Speer approved Governor Crawford's course in 
asking for a regiment of cavalry for Indian service but 
pointed out that the greater danger to Kansas was not the 
Indian on the west but the bushwhacker on the east. No 
doubt Mr. Speer's residence in Lawrence had some influence 
in determining his point of view. In an editorial of Feb-
ruary 16, the Lawrence editor called the attention of the 
department commander at Fort Leavenworth to the necessity of 
keeping an adequate force of regulars on the eastern border 
to protect Kansas from bushwhackers during the coming summer. 
The recent eaoking of the town of Aubrey was cited as a 
warning of what was to happen unless active defensive steps 
were taken. It was also asserted that hundreds of deserters 
rrom Price's army were skulking in the region of Fort Scott 
waiting for the spring before renewing activities. 
Before the year was halt spent, bushwhacker depredations 
both real and fancied had increased until the Governor of 
Kansas took a hand to stop them. On J/ay 12, Governor Craw-
ford telegraphed MaJor General Dodge, department commander 
24. 
at Fort Leavenworth, asking that the Seventh Kansas or some 
other good regiment be sent to the eastern border as a 
8
patrol. Simultaneously he asked General R. B. Mitchell of 
Fort Leavenworth to send three or four cavalry companies 
from Fort Scott up the border and into laissouri. Tho reason 
back of this request was stated by Crawford to be the con-
centration of bushwhaokers in Missouri between Independence 
9
and Lexington. There is no evidence, however, to indiaate 
that either General Dodge or General Mitahell oomplied with 
10 
these requests. 
While Governor Crawford was seeking federal aid, the 
citizens of Lawrence were taking steps for their own protec-
tion. s. R. Thompson, captain of the Sixteenth Kansas Volun-
teer Cavalry and poet commander at Lawrence, issued a procla-
mation on May 12, warning citizens of a threatened bushwhacker 
11 
invasion. The people were urged to organize a permanent 
picket along the Wakarusa River. The picket was organized 
and maintained for several weeks,but the threatened invasion 
failed to materialize. No further developments occurred 
until September when rumors reached Topeka oonoerning a con-
templated raid into the east-central part of the State. 
Governor Crawford on September 10 wrote to Brigadier General 
J. T. Bui~ris of Olathe informing him that bushwhaokera and 
returned rebels were organizing in Missouri ror a raid into 
Kansas. General Burris was instructed to post scouts along 
the border and to send one into Missouri to observe the 
12 
activities of the plotters. Like the invasion earlier in 
25. 
the year this one did not occur. The year closed with "all 
quiet" on the eastern front. 
Campaigning against buehwhaolcera in 1866 was begun by
Governor Fletcher of Missouri, who on February 3 telegraphed 
Crawford asking him to use his influence on General Dodge in 
order that federal cavalry could be dispatched to Jackson 
County and adJoining Missouri courities. The cavalry was 
needed, according to Governor Fletcher, to assist Missouri 
sheriffs in arresting numerous bushwhaclcers and border. ruf-
fians. The Missouri executive closed his message with the 
significant words: "If this is not done, look out for your 
towns near the border. Bushwhackers are organizing for some 
13 
purpose not yet known." 
I11 compliance :with Fletcher's wishes, the Kansas gover-
nor sent General Dodge a report of bushwhacker activities in 
Missouri and suggested the stationing of cavalry on the 
14 
border south of Kansas City. Crawford also notified General 
Do48e that a bushwhacker, charged with murder, was in Jail 
at Lawrence. Fearing efforts at release of the criminal by
hie friends, the Governor tatged that he be sent to the guard 
15 
house at Fort Leavenworth and kept until court convened. 
General Dodge failed to fulfill either or these requests. 
Instead or accepting Crawford's suggestion concerning the 
captured bushwhacker he sent more troops to Lawrence to 
forestall any attempts at liberating the captive and raiding 
the town. Thie is revealed by two of Governor Crawford's 
26. 
16 
telegrams. On March 15, Crawford wrote to Fletcher asking 
for further information concerning bushwhacker organization 
in Western tlissouri. That same day he wrote to Ma.Jar E. J. 
Ross of La~Tenoe tendering him a commission as lieutenant 
colonel and aid de camp with instructions to quietly organize 
17 
and equip the militia companies in and around Lawrence. 
Crawford's motives for this action, as expressed in his in-
structions to Ross, were that the protection ot the city 
should be adequately provided for without calling out the 
regular militia and without creating unneoessary alarm in 
the eastern part of the State. 
Apparently realizing that he must seek the highest 
military authority, Crawford on March lo telegraphed General 
Pope calling for a cavalry force. to break up bushwhacker 
18 
organization in Western Missouri. Pope replied the next day
by refusing to send the troops to occupy any part of Mia-
19 . . 
souri •. Re stated that it was injudicious to do so since 
outlaws were infesting all parts of the country alike. It 
is quite evident that Pope did not wish to set a precedent 
by providing federal aid in putting down local disturbances. 
That Crawford, before appealing to Pope, had again tried to 
persuade General Dodge to take action is indicated by a tel-
20 
egram from Dodge to Crawford dated March 21. In this dis-
patch Dodge referred the Governor to General Pope, stating 
that under his orders he was prohibited from sendiDB troops 
21 
either to the border or to Lawrence. 
27. 
Not being able to obtain assistance from federal auth-
orities, the Missouri and Kansas governors fell back upon 
the militia. Crawford, on }!arch 16, wrote to General Burris 
at Olathe and informed him of Governor b"'letcher•s warning 
that sixty bushwhackers were located at Waverly on the Mis-
souri River. Burris was ordered to see that the militia in 
his district was thoroughly organized and equipped and to 
keep posted on the movements of the bushwhackers. The let-
ter closed with the statement that there was little danger 
to the State it each company and regiment of the militia 
22 
were fully organi~ed. 
In view ot this last statement by Crawford there seems 
to be little justification for his frantic appeal to Gener-
als Dodge and Pope for federal assistance. That the bush-
whackers in Missouri were organizing cannot be denied, but 
that they were a sufficient menace to warrant calling out 
United states troops should be seriously doubted. The facts 
are that in 1866 none of the rumored raids on Kansas ever 
materialized. Furthermore the militia preparations under-
taken at Lawrence and along the eastern tier of counties 
proved adequate to meet the situation. 
In the far southeastern part of the State. residents 
were bothered to some degree by marauders. iwenty-nine 
citizens of Baxter Springs, Cherokee County, on September 3 
petitioned Governor Crawford to send two companies of mil-
itia to the vicinity to defend the county from a gaDg of 
28. 
well armed desperadoes who were raiding in the immediate 
neighborhood. The petition asked for one company ea@h of 
infantry and cavalry. While there is no direct evidence in 
the Crawford correspondence that this petition was answered, 
it is probable that the Governor met the situation by order-
23 
ing the organization of the militia of Cherokee County. 
With the close of 1866, bushwhacker depredations in 
Kansas and Missouri died away, never to be repeated upon 
·such a large scale. While it is true that some local dis-
turbances occurred in subsequent years, they were small in 
size and short in duration. The reign of the bushwhacker 
belonged exclusively to the lawless civil war period and 
receded gradually with the return of law and order. 
CHAPTER III 
INDIAN WARS IN KANSAS AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES 
1863-1865 
29. 
Before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Plains Indian 
and the rapidly onrushing white invader had come to look 
upon each other as enemies. Ea.oh dimly recognized that a 
bitter contest for supremacy was some day going to take 
place. Had not the Civil war intervened, this gigantic rac-
ial struggle possibly would have occurred in the early Six-
ties instead of several years later. To the Plains Indian 
it mattered little whether a white man espoused the cause of 
Abraham Lincoln or Jefferson Davis. ne recognized all white 
men as common enemies. The Comanche Indians will serve as 
an illustration. In Texas the members of this tribe raided 
the settlements of Confederates, while farther to the north 
in Kansas other Comanches were engaged in depredations upon 
the lives of Union men and women. The Plains Indian was too 
little concerned with the issues in the slavery struggle and 
too tar away from the scene of action to have been an impor-
tant factor in the War. Nevertheless, both North and South 
aooused the other of having incited the fierce nomads of the 
Plains to attack their settlements. Especially was this 
accusation circulated in Kansas. Throughout the Civil War, 
zo. 
newspapers alleged that Confederate plotters were at work 
among the Plains tribes, especially the Cheyennes and Arapa-
1 
hoes. Governor Crawford in his account has supported this 
2
contention. It is true that George and Charlie Bent, halt-
breed Cheyenne sons of William Bent, the trader, Joined the 
Confederate army at the beginning of the war. After being 
captured and parolled the boys returned to their home at 
Bent's Fort on the Arkansas. During the Cheyenne War ot 
1864-5 both of the Bent boys accompanied the Indians on 
3
their raids. Very probably this taot accounts tor many ot 
the stories of Confederate activity among the Indians. 
In contrast to the number of rumors of collusion be-
tween Confederates and Indians, the actual attempts made by
the southerners were few. One of these, however, merits 
attention. In 1863 a group of Confederates was massacred 
by Osage Indians on the verdigris Niver in Southeastern Kan-
•sas. Examination of the papers carried by the dead men re-
vealed to Captain Doudna of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry the 
astounding fact that every one of the slain party was a com-
missioned officer. It was further disclosed that they were 
sent by General Kirby Smith as a commission to treat with 
the Indian tribes of the west and Southwest and incite them 
to war against the settlers of Y~nsas. Detailed plans of 
the Confederates provided that the officers were to divide 
up among the tribes and endeavor to secure their cooperation 
4
in the war of extermination which they planned to wage. 
31 •. 
S1noe the plot failed it is idle to speculate as to w:tiat 
might otherwise have happened; nevertheless, it seems plaus-
ible to assert that the commission stood a much better 
ohanoe of los1lJ8 their scalps at the hands of the Indians 
of the Plains than of suooeeding in their scheme against the 
Union. 
In 1864 General Curtis, commander of the Military 
Department of Kansas, fearing that the Confederates were 
planning to make a raid upon Forts Larned and Lyon, ordered 
that federal troops be transferred from the Platte River to 
the Arkansas. Preparations accordingly were me.de, but the. 
5
Confederate raid proved to be a mere rumor. Some evidence, 
nevertheless, does exist to show that the Indians were aware 
of Confederate plans. Simeon Whitely, United States Indian 
agent at Denver, mentioned having heard threats by Comanches, 
Kiowas, and Cheyennes to take all the forts on the Arkansas 
6
River when Joined by the Texas soldiers. 
Despite theee diaquiet1?l8 rumors, War Department re-
ports for the Plains indicate that up to March, 1864, no 
intormation had reached headquarters that the Indians were 
'1 
considered unfriendly. General Curtis was busily engaged 
fighting bushwhackers and evidently had no idea that an 
Indian war was at hand. Like the Sioux War in Minnesota 
during 1862, the Cheyenne War of 1864 was preoipitated by
injudioioua action upon the part of young military officers. 
A certain Lieutenant Eayre, in attempting to recover some 
32. 
cattle supposedly stolen by Cheyennes, punished the wroll8 
Indians. To make matters worse, Lieutenant Dunn ot the ' 
First Colorado Cavalry on April 12th attacked a small band
of Dog Soldier Cheyennes on the South Platte. The Indians 
were young warriors who were on their way north to visit 
8
their Northern Cheyenne relatives. A little later, Lieu-
tenant Eayre drove Crow Chief and his Cheyenne band from 
their camp on the Republican River. In another expedition, 
Eayre met a group of Cheyennes near Fort Larned and again 
attacked them. This time he received the worst of the en-
counter and was forced to retreat to the Fort. The wrath 
of the warlike Cheyennes was aroused to a high degree by
these attacks. A general Indian outbreak in Eastern Colo-
rado and Western Kansas and Nebraska was the result. 
Logically the Indians selected the·great western high-
ways as their main objectives. Immediately following Lieu-
tenant Eayre•s fight with the Indians near Larned, the 
redskins raided the stage road between Forts Larned and 
9
Riley. Arapahoes, antagonized by Ca~tain Parmenter ot Fort 
Larned, joined their Cheyenne friends on the warpath. The 
combined tribes then set about systematically to attack the 
Platte Trail and Santa Fe Trail, although they concentrated 
their efforts on the former. The trail to Santa Fe was 
generally left to the tender mercy of the Kiowas and Co-
manches, who resided south of the Arkansas River, and who 
10 
also took to the warpath. 
33. 
Realizing that a general outbreak was at hand. General 
Mitchell, commanding the Nebraska District of the Military 
Department of Kansas, asked General Curtis on May 27 for 
one thousand men and an artillery battery to protect the 
Platte Trail. Governor Evans of Golorado Territory also 
requested that Curtis protect the South Platte and Arkansas 
routes. The Colorado exeoutive 1 apparently not getting sat-
isfaction from the Department commander, on June 16 turned 
to General Carleton at Santa Fe for aid. He desired that 
Carleton send troops to Fort Union, New Mexico, subject to 
11
call from Colorado. An unique attempt at handling the 
hostile Indians was made by Governor Evans in June. A 
proclamation was issued and sent to the Indian tribes in· 
Eastern Colorado warning all friendly bands to report at 
certain oonoentration points. Cheyennes and Arapahoes were 
assigned to Fort Lyon, while the Kiowas and Comanches were 
ordered to Fort Larned. Thie proclamation was not obeyed 
12 
by the Indians to any great extent. 
Since the aborigines preferred taking chances with 
their lives in preference to coming in and being "Good In-
dians", the war on the Plains continued throughout the sum-
mer. In July the hostiles commenced depredations in the 
neighborhood ot Fort Larned. A government train bound tor 
Fort Union, New Mexico, was attacked, twelve men being 
13 
killed and a large q~ntity ot merchandise destroyed. 
Shortly afterwards, four large trains were besieged near 
34. 
Cow Creek, where a tremendous battle ensued. The beleaguer-
ed crews were finally rescued by some of Curtis' forces from 
14 
Fort Riley. 
General Curtis had taken the field during July.in a 
campaign which aimed to protect the trails and settlements 
and at the same time intimidate the Indians • .Kansas militia, 
stationed at Emporia, were ordered to report to Curtis and 
15 
hold themselves in readiness for assistance at any time. 
Curtis reported that his force numbered 395 men and ooneie-
ted ot militia, volunteers and regulars aided by a seotion 
of Ninth Wisoonein Artillery. In his letters the General 
referred to the siege on Cow Creek and an attack by Indians 
16 
on Fort Larned. Curtis was highly commended by the press 
17 
for his energetic oampaign against the Indians. Before he 
had time to really accomplish much in an Indian war, how-
ever, the General was forced to abandon the project and 
return to Fort Leavenw~rth. The eastern border demanded 
immediate protection against the threatened raid of Sterling 
Price into Western Missouri. Curtis• chief o.ooompliahment 
during his summer on the Plaine was the founding of two mil-
itary posts, Forts Ellsworth and Zarah. 
While Curtis was still on the Plains, numerous Indian 
attacks occurred in Northern Kansas and Southern Nebraska. 
Newspaper reports from Uarysville, Kansas, stated that six-
teen whites had been killed and soalped and that nearly the 
entire population of Washington County w~s encamped in the 
35. 
18 
town tor protection. In Marshall County the militia assisted 
by a company ot Seventh Iowa Cavalry staged a four hour bat-
tle with a superior Indian force, but wer~ foroed to re-
19 
treat. In Nebraska and Eastern Colorado the overland Mail 
was oompelled to abandon four hundred miles of its route, 
while all stations but one along a line of one hundred and 
twenty miles had been burned. Immigration into Colorado and 
20 
California over the Platte Trail was decisively checked. 
The Indian hostiles were reported to have definitely pro-
olaimed that the land belonged exclusively to them and that 
they intended to regain and hold it if they were forced to 
destroy every white man, woman and child to accomplish their 
21 
purpose. To meet this situation Governor Evans in August 
issued a proclamation to Colorado citizens advising them to. 
hunt down Indiana and kill all hostiles. This resulted in 
22 
all the Indians of the region going to war. Evans later 
testified before a Joint congressional committee that he had 
issued this proclamation at a time when Colorado had no 
23 
troops to defend it. 
In an effort to make peace, Major Wynooop, comma~der at 
Fort Lyon, rounded up the leading Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
ohiefs and took them to Denver to interview the Governor. 
Evans refused to come to terms with the chiefs, informing 
them that he was not the peace-making power and that they 
24 
must make peace with the military authorities. For taking 
this stand Governor Evans was rebuked by Commissioner Dole 
of the Indian Bureau. trr. Dole reminded Evans that his duty 
36. 
as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Colorado 
required him to receive and encourage all advances.made by
25
the Indians in an effort to secure peace. 
Peace efforts having failed, the Indian war continued 
until cold weather drove the hostiles into winter quarters. 
Before the descent of winter, however, there were several 
Indian scares in Kansas. Manhattan residents on October 19th 
informed AdJutant General Holliday that the entire military 
escort of the Santa Fe Express had been massacred west of 
Salina. Holliday was petitioned to send the Pottawattomie 
26 
County Militia back to the western frontier at once. Con-
sequently, the AdJutant General directed Colonel Price ot 
the Fifteenth Kansas Militia, then located at Fort Riley, 
to give special attention to the frontier in the neighbor-
hood of Salina. Governor Carney was also requested by
Holliday to grant the petition concerning the militia. Col-
onel Price, however, discovered that the story of the mas-
. saore of the stage escort was a fake. The escort arrived 
safely at Fort Zarah, although the frightened stage driver, 
having mistaken buffalo for Indians, returned to Salina. 
Price promised to keep the state authorities informed con-
cerning future Indian disturbances. He clearly indicated, 
on the other hand, that he would use his discretion in de-
27 
fending the frontier settlements. 
, 
As a climax to the year's fighting came the Chivington 
Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians at Sand Creek on November 
37. 
29th. The Sand Creek camp was located near E'ort Lyon on the 
reservation which had been set aside for the Cheyenne and 
Arapahoe tribes by the Treaty of Fort Wise (later Fort Lyon) 
in 1861. As a matter of fact the Cheyennes had seldom re-
mained on the reservation, which lay south of the Arkansas 
River in Colorado, but had roamed at will from the Red Hiver 
to the North Platte. In the late summer of 1864, however, 
Black Xottle and White Antelope, in compliance with Governor 
Evans• proclamation, brought their respective tribes ot 
Cheyennes in and camped near Fort Lyon. It is a point of 
interest to note that the camp was composed almost entirely 
or women, children, and old men. The warriors in most oases 
28 
remained on the warpath. While Black Kettle, White Antelope, 
and other chiefs were in Denver el)8ag1ng in a peace powwow 
with Governor Evans three war parties of Cheyennes and two 
29 
of Arapahoes were still out. 
On November 29th the Cheyenne and Arapahoe camp on Sand 
Creek was attacked by Colonel Chivington with a large force 
composed of regulars and Colorado volunteers. Of the five 
hundred Indians in camp about one hundred fifty were killed, 
30 
two-thirds being women and children. The slaughter was 
frightful since the Indians were surprised and poorly armed. 
Atrocities committed by the troops were fu1ly as bad as 
31 
those usually practised by Indians upon their victims. Fol-
lowing the attack, the remnants of the tribes fled to the 
Dig Timbers of the Smoky Hill in Western Kansas. 
38. 
A great furore was raised in the 'East when the news of 
the massacre was fully published. General Halleck, Chief ot 
staff, at once ordered an investigation of Chivington•s con-
duct. while General Curtis attempted to have him court-
martialled. Chivington•s term of service had expired, thoush. 
and he was beyond the reach of military law. Ooll8ress in 
1865 attempted to punish Chivington and all members of the 
Third Colorado Regiment who engaged in the massacre. A res-
olution, s. R. 93, was introduced into the Senate to suspend 
the pay of all officers and men who so participated until nn 
investigation could take place. The measure passed the Sen-
32 
ate in January but was killed in the House. In the follow-
ing session of Congress, however, the annual Indian appro-
priation bill was so amended that the members of the Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe bands who suffered at Sand Creek were to be 
recompensed in United States securities, animals, goods, 
provisions or such articles as the Secretary of the Interior 
33 
might direct. The total amount of these gifts was ~39,050. 
This Congressional act was in harmony with Article Six of 
the Treaty of the Little Arkansas, which had been drawn up 
October 14, 1865. The entire Article was a condemnation by 
34
the United States Government of Chivington•s action. The 
Indians thus emerged triumphant from the affair, while their 
conqueror, Chivington, fell into deep disgrace in the eyes 
of the Nation. To the Ea.sterner, at least, Chivinaton meri-
ted about as much esteem as Benedict Arnold or Aaron Burr. 
Although this is not an attempt to excuse Chivington 
39. 
and his mon for their brutal, inhuman atrocities at Sand 
Creek, it is worth while to point out some of the reasons 
why the massacre oooUl'red. Judged from purely a military 
point of view, in which considerations of humanity have no 
plnoe, it was good Judgment to carry the war to the home of 
the Indian. EJq,erience had Froved that by only such methods 
could Indian uprisi?Jge be crushed. Chivington, therefore, 
usod the same prooeedure which later won such nation-wide 
fame for Sheridan and Custer. Fu.rtllermore, there had been 
a demand for a winter campaign against the 'Indians. On Nov-
ember 19th, General Blunt, commanding the Upper .Arkansas'. 
35 
District, wrote to General Curtis urging a, winter campaign •. 
Governor Evans of Colorado had previously suggested the 
eoheme as the only means of oonquering the hostiles and 
36 
brill81ng them to respeot governmental authority •. Public 
opinion in the frontier regions also was favorable to the 
wintor campaign. The Junction City Union, a Kansas paper, 
openly advocated it. 
"A suooeasful war can only be waged against them 
(the Indians) by organizing an expedition that 
will penetrate their country and find the rendez-
vous of their women and children. Then they will 
37 
stand and fight armed men and not before." 
A third reason for the maseaore is that the "hundred 
day volunteers", who made up the Third Colorado Cavalry, 
were chiefly frontiersmen who had suffered at the hands of 
40. 
the Cheyennes and .Arapahoes throughout the previous summer. 
To these men rules of warfare meant nothing. They retaliated 
38 
with atrocity for atrooity. 
~n the long run the real sufferer from the Chivington 
Massacre was the frontier settler. Public sentiment in tho 
East largely turned against him. The Indian, on the other 
hand, became a hero and martyr in the minds of many people 
living east of the Jifissiasippi. This sentiment spread into 
Congress and seriously handicapped legislation aimed at 
frontier defense. Senator Rosa of Kansas, on July 18, 1867, 
attempted to amend a bill by providing that the General of 
the Army should be authorized to aooept the services of 
mounted volunteers from the governors of western states for 
suppression of Indian hostilities. He was outvoted, however, 
and compelled to accept a modification which defeated the 
39 
purpose of the amendment. Morrill of Maine, speaking in 
opposition to Rosa,.stated that volunteers from the frontier 
states caused all the difficulties with the Indians. As an 
example he cited the work of the Colorado volunteers in the 
40 
Chivington_Massacre. 
Indian raids did not die out altogether during the win-
ter of 1864-5. Hardly had the new year become well estab-
lished before a raid occurred on the Santa Fe Trail west ot 
Fort Larned. Cheyennes and Arapahoes number1IJ8 Qlose to one 
hundred :fifty attacked a wagon train at Iiine Mile Ridge, 
41 
wounding six white men. The Indian loss was unknown. 
41. 
Shortly after this episode the hostile bands of the two 
tribes moved north into Nebraska, headed for the Powder 
River Country. General Mitchell, commanding the District of 
Nebraska, (This was before its reorganization in 1865 as the 
Department of the Platte.), in order to drive the Indians 
out of the Republican Valley region, burned the prairie 
42 
grass for over a hundred miles. The burned area extended 
throlJ8hout a favorite Indian hunt1118 region. This action of 
Mitchell's contributed to the exodus of the hostiles from 
Xaneae and Southern Nebraska. It simply meant on the other 
hand, that their forces were to be concentrated with the 
hostile Sioux along the Platte Trail and overland Telegraph 
line. As a consequence, the great Indian ware of 1866 took 
place outside of Kansas. 
During the absence of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the 
Kansas frontier enjoyed a brief respite •. Of course the 
Kiowas and Comanches wore engaged in a series of depreda-
tions, but, comparatively, things were quiet during the 
spring and summer. On April 25th, Indians attacked-Cow 
Creek Station on the Santa Fe stage Company line, driving 
43 
off sixteen head of cattle. On June 9th, Kiowas charged 
upon a wagon train on Crooked Creek, in the southwestern 
section of the State. The train, which consisted of about 
seventy wagons under a military escort, suooesefully defen-
ded itself. In August, the Government was compelled to send 
a heavy escort to Fort Za~ah in order to prevent the Indiana 
from oonfiaoating the eight thousand rations which were 
42. 
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· being delivered to the Fort. These rations were consigned 
to the Indians, but the Great Father at Washington preferred 
handing them out to his red children instead of having them 
taken by force. 
Having learned by experience the terrible cost of the 
Indian war of the previous year, the United States military 
authorities took decisive steps in 1865 to bring the war to 
a close. A three-fold plan was developed: first, to defend 
the settlements and routes of travel from Indian aggression; 
seoond, to invade the Powder River region in the Dakotas and 
strike a blow whioh would teach the Indian to respect the 
power of the Government; third, to make peaoe with the In-
dians in Kansas and arrange for their removal from the state. 
In pursuanoe of the first objective the Kansas government 
and people ably cooperated. Kansas troops also made up a 
large part of General ~odge•s Powder Hiver Expedition. As 
to the wisdom of the third part of the plan, ma.king peace 
with the Indians, Kansans were frankly dubious. 
The Kansas Legislature on January 1~. 1866, adopted a 
concurrent resolution requesting Congress to eeoure from the 
President: (1) Full and ample protection against hostile 
Indians on the western border, (2) Prosecution of an active 
campaign a~ainst the Indians by an adequate force of federal 
troops, (3) Permission for the Governor of Kansas to organ-
ize a regiment of veteran volunteer cavalry to serve for one 
45 
year in the Indian campaign. These requests reveal the trend 
43. 
of popular feeling within the State at the time. 
Another event of significance in January was the re-
organization of the. national military departments. ~he old 
Department of Kansas Vias replaced by the Department of the 
Missouri, with General Grenville M. Dodge succeeding General 
46 
Curtis. The state legislature, upon receipt of this infor-
47 
mat1on, extended Curtis a vote of thanks for his services. 
In an effort to insure a greater degree of safety to 
travel on the Santa Fe Trail, Colonel Ford, commanding the 
District of the Upper Arkansas, provided for escort service 
48
between Council Grove and Fort Larned. TWice a month, on 
the first and the fifteenth, a company of troops left Coun-
oil Grove as an escort for travelers and freighters •. From 
Larned west to Fort Union, New Mexico, the escort was com-
49 
posed or troops sent from the District of New Mexico. A 
similar arrangement was made for east-bound transportation. 
Fort Dodge was also constructed during the year as an added 
. 50 
protection to Santa Fe travel. 
An additional burden of protection was put upon the 
shoulders of the military authorities in Kansas when the 
Butterfield Overland Dispatch line was organized in 1865. 
The route extended for 585 miles from Leavenworth and Atchi-
51 
son to Denver.!.!.! the Smoky Hill River. From its very be-
ginning the B. o. n. needed military protection. In order 
to give the route adequate defense, a chain of forts and 
44. 
outposts was oonstruoted along the Smoky Hill Valley by the 
62
Government. The Butterfield line, ·dispite this aesistanoe, 
failed to make profits and didn't last long. Hostile In-
diana and too much competition with the Holladay line on the 
53 
Platte Trail proved its undoing. 
The frontier settlements in Western Kansas were suc-
cessfully defended during the year by Colonel Cloud and the 
64 
Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry. A contemplated offensive aeainst 
55 
the Indians by Colonel Ford VIB.S never carried out due to the 
interference of Colonel Leavenworth, agent to the Kiowas and 
Comanches, who fancied that he could end the war by negotia-
66 
tion. Colonel Ford was delayed by Interior Department 
officials until the spring was so far advanoed that the hos-
tiles were too strong to be attacked by his forces. 
While these events were transpiring, Governor Crawford 
was not idle. With his customary energy he plunged into the 
problem of frontier defense early in the year. In answer to 
numerous petitions from settlers in the south-central por-
tion of the State, Governor Crawford endeavored to persuade 
both Curtis and Dodge to send a small force of cavalry to 
57 
the region. Troubles had arisen between settlers and In-
dians in the Territory on account of cattle stealing. Many 
settlers were leaving because ot the danger of possible In-
dian raids. 
In August the Governor wrote to General Sheridan askill8 
for the immediate muster out of the Eighth and Tenth Kansas 
Volunteer Infantry. The reason given for the ·request was 
that the Indian situation on the western border looked 
58 
threatening. A few days later a similar request for the. 
45. 
muster out of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was transmitted 
59 
to General Grant. 
While the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry remained in the 
State, the Eleventh and the Sixteenth were sent north with 
General Dodge to restore oommunioation along the Platte 
Trail, to protect frontier settlements, and to drive the 
60 
Indians into the Blaok Hills. Although in February it had 
been the purpose of the Department of the Missouri to send 
the entire Eleventh Cavalry into. the Smoky Hill region for 
an Indian campaign, a change of orders sent them to Fort 
Kearney, Nebraska, While part of the regiment guarded the 
Platte Trail and Overland Telegraph, the balance was sent 
to Fort Laramie for the spring campaign against the Sioux on 
61 . 
Powder River. The work of protecting the transcontinental 
highway, although difficult, was admirably performed. In-
dians fairly swarmed along the telegraph line, but the 
soldiers were never driven from the field and.the wires were 
62 
kept in working order. On June 11th Colonel Preston B. 
Plumb was ordered to reopen and protect the Overland Stage 
Line and give all possible protection to emigrants and other 
travel. For the next two months Plumb and his men guarded 
the stage line, drove the stages by using cavalry horses, 
63 
and kept the United States mail on schedule. In August the 
Eleventh was ordered to Fort Leavenworth and mustered out of 
46. 
service. 
Less glorious was the performance of the Sixteenth Kan-
sas Cavalry in the ~lack Hills. The Sixteenth had the mis-
fortune to participate in a disastrous campaign. General 
Connor's forces were outnumbered and outgeneraled by the 
Sioux and Cheyenne warriors. The attempt to strike the In-
dian in his stronghold resulted in so much griet that the 
proJeot had to be abandoned. The losses of the Sixteenth, 
nevertheless, were very small. One soldier was killed, one 
64 
wounded. 
In October, General Grant announced his Indian policy. 
Generals Sherman and Pope were instructed to give particular 
attention to the problem of putting an end to Indian troub-
les along the great overland highways. Additional permanent 
forts were to be established along the Platte, Smoky Hill 
and Arkansas routes. Finally, the volunteers were to be 
65 
replaced by four thousand colored troops. This last move 
for several reasons was quite judicious. The negroes not 
only had proved to be good soldiers, but they were suppos-
66 
edly more free from prejudices against the Indians. In 
addition to these advantages the negroes were w1llill8 to 
serve, whereas the white volunteers became quite ineffective 
67 
on account of their anxiety to be mustered out. 
Another important event of October, 1865, was the nego-
tiation of a treaty with the southern Plains tribes. The 
I 
Chivington Massacre had the effect of practically annulling 
47. 
the treaty of Fort Wise, since the Cheyennes and .Arapahoes 
were afraid to remain in the region set aside for them in 
Colorado by the treaty. Renee it was desirable to make a 
new treaty which would include not only peace terms but pro-
visions for settling the Indians on a permanent reservation. 
Indian commissioners selected by Congress came to Kansas in 
Ootober and negotiated treaties with the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, 
Comanche, and Kiowa tribes. Two treaties were made: one 
with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the other with the Co-
manches and Kiowas. On October 14th, on the Little Arkansas 
River near the site of the present city of Wichita, the 
final agreements were drawn up. The United States was rep-
resented by seven oommissioners: General Sanborn; General 
w. s. Harney; Thomas Murphy, Superintendent of Indian Af-
fairs in the Central Superintendency; Kit Carson, the famous 
frontiersman; William w. Bent, the fur trader; Jesse H. 
Leavenworth, agent of the Comanches and Kiowas; and James 
Steele. The Indian delegation was composed of the mos·t 
68
influential members of their respective tribes. 
The most important terms of the treaty were contained 
in Articles 2, 3, and 4. The first of these provided for 
setting aside a permanent reservation for the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes, south of the Arkansas River. The Kiowas and 
Comanches were assigned to a region in Northwestern Texas 
and Indian Territory. The Indians were not to settle upon 
the reservations until the United States had extinguished 
the titles of the Cherokees and other claimants. When 
48. 
absent from these reservations the Indians were not to so 
within ten miles of any of the main traveled routes. All 
claims of the Indians to the region between the Platte and 
the Arkansas were given up. Article 3 permitted the Indians 
to range in the unsettled portions between the two rivers. 
69 
Article 9 abrogated all existing treaties. 
The United States Senate, on May 22, 1866, ratified the 
treaty with four amendments. The moat significant of these 
was the amendment to Article 2. The Senate provided that no 
Indian reservation mentioned in the treaty should be located 
within the State of Kansas. Article 6 was also amended by 
, 70 
removing the personal reference to Colonel Chivington. The 
Senate amendments were accepted by the Indians in November, 
1866. and the treaty was formally proclaimed by President 
71 
Johnson on February 2, 1867. 
As a preventative for future Indian wars the treaty was 
very defective. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were left with-
out any definite reservation,sinoe the Senate amendment to 
Article 2 excluded them from Kansas, while Article 9 took 
away their Colorado reserve. With these tribes turned loose 
and allowed to roam at will between the Platte and the 
Arkansas, the daDger of conflicts with the whites remained 
as grave a problem as ever. Furthermore, that part of 
Article 2 whioh provided for the Indian rema1n1118 away from 
the main traveled routes could not possibly be enforced ex-
.capt by the Indians themselves. 
49. 
Muoh evidence exists to oast doubt upon the permanency 
of the Indians• peaoetul intentions. on their way to the 
oounoil grounds a party of braves celebrated by attacking a 
72 
Mexican train near Fort Dodge and killing five men. Aleo, 
the treaty. like most agreements with the Indians. was made 
in the fall when the warriors were tired of fighting and 
were looking forward to a winter of rest and recuperation in 
order to get ready for another big year. In November, con-
sequently, Colonel Leavenworth was able to report truthfully 
that "his Indians" had for the most part, if not entirely, 
73 
stopped depredations along the Santa Fe Trail. 
50. 
CHAPTER IV 
INDIAN WARS OF 1866-1867 IN KANSAS 
Part One, 1866 
Comparatively speaking, the year 1866 passed rather 
quietly on the Kansas frontier. It was a period ot lull 
after the ware ot 1864-5 and preoedil18 the great outbreak of 
1867. Indian depredations were not only lees numerous but 
of a more petty nature than those of the previous years. 
Early in the year the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes sent 
messengers to their northern brethern in order to persuade 
those hostiles to make peace. MaJor Wynooop, former oom-
mander at Fort Lyon, was appointed by the war Department to 
l 
escort the envoys. 
Indian outbreaks began in May along the Solomon River 
2
and near Lake Sibley. Governor Crawford at once organized a 
battalion of militia and sent them to the region. The state 
troopers soon came into contact with the Indians. engaging a 
band of Cheyennes in a sharp fight in the Lake Sibley neigh-
3
borhood. In July and August seve·ral raids occurred on \Vhi te 
Rock and Lulu Creeks, tributaries of the Solomon River. 
Cheyennes were not guilty of the Lulu Creek attacks, these 
4
being the work of Pawnees and Oma.bas. In October and Novem-
ber, hunters were driven in by Indians on the Solomon. 
Petty robberies and thefts were also committed in Clay, 
Republioa-n and Shirley Counties. 
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Governor Crawford discovered in August that not only 
the Pawnees but Osages ae well were responsible for the 
reoent frontier outrages. He therefore ordered Colonel 
Cloud to visit their reservations and investigate. General 
w. s. ltanoook, oommanding the Department of the Missouri. 
was requested to furnish an excort from Fort Riley for 
5
Colonel Cloud. 
Overland transportation suffered more than did the 
6
frontier settlements during 186G. The Smoky llill Route 
continued to receive its full share of attention by the 
Indians. This no doubt was due to the fact that the Union 
Paoifio Railroad Ee.stern Division was moving.rapidly west-
ward along the Ke.wand Smoky Hill Valleys and gave promise 
of soon threatening the favorite buffalo hunting grounds of 
7
the red men. The Butterfield overland Dispatch, whioh mon-
opolized traffic over the route, was purchased by the Holla-
day interests 1n 1866 and merged with the Platte line into 
8
the Holladay Overland Mail and Express Company. On April 
twentieth the new company started a daily schedule from both 
Topeka and Denver. As fast as the railroad was completed 
9
westward the stage~ were moved to "End of Track". 
Ae a protection to freighters, the War Department in 
February issued an order which required wagon trains to have 
at least twenty wagons and thirty men before they would be 
52. 
allowed to pass Fort Kearney on the Platte Trail, Fort Riley 
on the Smoky Hill Route or Fort Larned on the Santa Fe 
10 
Trail. stages on all routes were guarded generally by mili-
tary escorts while passing through the Indian Country. At 
each station a non-commieaioned offioer with a squad of sol-. . 11 
diers met the stage and escorted it to the next station • 
. ThrOU8hout the year Governor Crawford exerted tremen-
dous efforts to put down Indian disturbances. The expense 
of defending the frontier with state militia was so great 
that the Governor hesitated to use them. Aa a consequence 
he appealed to the War Department and district commanders to 
12 
protect the settlements, but received no response. He tele-
graphed to the Secretary of War for cavalry arms, with which 
to arm the settlers, but failed to get them. The War 
Department informed Crawford that a shortage ot troops pre-
vented them from properly guarding the border. Crawford 
replied by offering to raise a Kansas regiment to be mustered 
into the United States service for the purpose of proteot11'18 
the frontier until it could be replaced by army regulars. 
13 
This offer was also rejected. These efforts having failed, 
the Kansas F..xeoutive telegraphed to the department commander 
at Fort Leavenworth stating that immediate action was needed 
and that, if the department commander would not act, he (the 
Governor) would send Ua.Jor.General Cloud with militia to 
pursue the Indians to their reservations. punish them, and 
14 
compel indemnity for their past conduct. This elicited a 
response from General Hancock, who, on August twenty-eighth, 
53. 
assured the Governor that he would cooperate with the state 
authorities 1n every possible wa7. Ha.noook had sent a 
scouting party of one hundred cavalry from Fort llarker to 
tho Solomon and suggested that they·operate with the state 
16 rn111tia who were already scouting in that region. 
In the meantime, General Cloud was touring the settle-
ments upon the Republican and Solomon Rivers. Here he pro-
ceeded to organize the residents into militia companies. He 
reported that the ma.Jority of the settlers were Civil War 
16 
veterans and possessed guns but needed ammunition. As a 
result of his personal observations Cloud recommended to 
Governor Crawford that the militia be reorganized,and that a 
United States military post be established in the exposed 
11
region. 
In the latter part of AU8Ust, Colonel Wyncoop, in his 
ottioial role as a peacemaker, assembled a grouD of Cheyenne 
and Arapahoe ohiefs at Fort Harker for a council. The In-
dians thought that the Government had forgotten them since 
their promised annuities hadn't been received. 'l'heir atti-
tude toward the construction of the railroad up the Smoky 
Rill was one ot resignation to the inevitable. They real-
ized (so they said) that the white man was too numerous to 
be overcome. FUrthermore. they promised to restrain their 
18 
7oung men from additional depredations. 
At no time in 1866 did the activities of the Indians 
assume the proportions of a general outbreak such as that of 
64. 
1864-5. As a consequence, the strenuous attempts ot Gover-
nor Crawford to compel the War Department to intervene in 
behalf ot Kansas seem unnecessary. That both the War Depart-
ment officials and General Hancook held this belief is sig-
nified by_their policy of ignoring Crawford's feverish cries 
for assistance until they became so frequent that they had 
to be heeded. 
Although Crawford's action in this inetanoo was not 
altogether commendable, he accomplished another pieoe of 
work which perhaps was more praiseworthy. Having learned 
from the commander of Fort Harker that most of the outrages 
and murders committed by the Indians could be traced direct-
ly to alcoholic liquors, Governor Crawford recommended that .
the State Legislature prohibit all liquor trat!io 1n Kansas 
19 
beyond the limits of the organized counties. In oomplianoe 
with this suggestion, the Legislature passed House Bill No. 
20 
106, which became a law on Februar~ 23, 1867. 
Additional evidence that the Governor and people of 
Kansas may have been excessively exoited over Indian troub-
les during the year was furnished by General William T. 
Sherman, who had been touring Kansas and Colorado in the 
fall of 1866. Sherman encountered no Indian troubles other 
than rumors. In referring to the latter he said, "These are 
all mysterious, and only accountable on the supposition that 
our people out West are resolved on trouble for the sake of 
21 
the profit resulting from the military ocoupation." 
CHAPTER IV 
Part Two, 186, 
55. 
In his own personal narrative Governor Crawford states: 
"When I returned trom Washington in April. 186?, General 
Hanoook was in the field with a handful of United States 
troops, and the plains of Kansas were swarming with blood-
22 
thirsty Indians." Hancock had left Fort Leavenworth early 
in March upon a campaign designed to bring the Indians into 
submission. By showing a large force including artillery it 
wae hoped that the red men would be frightened into a per-
manent peaoe. Hanoook, with six companies of infantry and 
artillery,.marched to Fort Riley where he was Joined by
Colonel George A. Custer, with four companies of seventh 
Cavalry and one infantry company. At Fort Harker the expe-
.dition added two more cavalry troops. With this small army 
Hanoook marched to Fort Larned, arriving on the seventh of 
23 
April. 
Cheyennes and Sioux were camped on Pawnee Fork about 
thirty miles northwest ot the fort. When the Indians per-
sistently refused to come in and make a treaty, Hancock 
decided to march on their encampment. On April 14th the 
regiment moved forward. Before reaching the camp they were 
met b7 a large body of Indians bearil'l8 a white flag. The 
ohiefs said they wanted peace instead of war; nevertheless, 
56. 
Hancock's troops moved forward and camped near their village. 
The Indians, fearing another Sand Creek maesaore, fled dur-
ing the night. Custer pursued them the next day, but the 
Indians, after raiding the Overland Stage Company stations 
on the Smoky Hill, scattered. Hanoook burned the Indian 
village on Pawnee Fork and then marched to Fort Dodge. 
After remaining at Dodge several days hie troops headed for 
Fort Hays. From thence he returned to Fort Harker, and on 
May 7th left that plaoe for Leavenworth. Custer, with hie 
Seventh Cavalry, remained in the field in pursuit of Pawnee 
Killer and hie band of hostile Sioux. "Hanoook's War" thus 
24
oame to a sudden end following a very auspicious beginnine. 
Custer's pursuit of Pawnee Killer extended northward 
into Nebraska. The hostiles refused all overtures ot peaoe 
and several times turned on Custer and became the pursuer 
instead of the pursued. After campaigning throughout the 
greater part of the summer the expedition returned to Fort 
Wallaoe in July. having failed to get more than an even 
break with their enemies. Lieutenant Kidder and a party of 
ten men, sent :from Fort Sedgwick with dispatches for Custer, 
26 
were annihilated by Indians. 
Hancock's campaign was unfortunate in its results, 
since it accomplished little except to incite the Indians to 
commit further depredations. Indian outbreaks in Kansas had 
been negligible prior to the expedition up Pawnee Fork. It 
is possible, therefore, that the war in 1867 was thus 
57. 
precipitated by General Hancock himself. With both the 
Paoifio railroads stretching out through the Indian Country, 
the situation was extremely delicate when the year opened. 
Through.ignorance of Indian character the department com-
mander oommitted the fatal blunder which started off one of 
the most serious seasons of Indian troubles which the Plains 
26 
ever witnessed. 
Indian depredations in Kansas throughout the year were 
oentered on the Smoky Hill Route and the settlements in the 
Solomon and Republican Valleys. By the middle of July the 
Union Paoifio Eastern Division had reached Fort Harker and 
the town ot Ellsworth. On September 18th the track extended 
to the 275 mile post at a point within ten miles of Fort 
27 
Hays. The Holladay Overland Mail and Express continued on 
28 
its daily schedule between End of Track and Denver. 
As early as April 22nd Indians were reported swarming 
29 
along the Smoky Hill Route. It was estimated by stage pas-
S8rJ8ers that they numbered two or three thousand. No doubt 
a great many of these were the Cheyennes and Sioux whom 
Hancock had routed a few days previously on Pawnee Fork. 
The greatest danger point along the route was the stretch 
between Ellsworth and Fort Wallace. During most of the sum-
mer the engineering and road building crews were advancing 
through this region. On May 23rd, R. M. Shoemaker, general 
superintendent of the Union Paoifio Eastern Division, tele-
graphed Governor Crawford announcing an Indian attack on 
68. 
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workers near Monument Station. In June, Shoemaker's tele-
grams persistently called upon Crawford for aid. Besinnil'.16 
with a raid west of Fort Harker on June 14th, the depreda-
tions increased in number and intensity. Shoemaker wired 
Crawford on the twenty-first asking for militia. This was 
followed three days later by an urgent messaee in which ho 
informed the Governor that two workers had been killed and 
all workmen driven off the line for a distance of twenty 
miles. Five hundred stand of the best arms and plenty ot 
ammunition were requested. The telegram closed with this 
eta tement: ''Unless you send us protection our work muet be 
31 
abandoned." On June 24th, John D. Ferry, President of the 
Union Paoifio Dtstern Division, appealed to Crawford for 
immediate aid,, eta.ting that in the absence of Oeneral nan-
cook he knew no other one to whom he could turn. Perry 
explained that Indian depredations extended along the wholo 
line of road, that one thousand labor~rs on seventy-five 
miles of line had been driven in, and that his men were 
32 
practically unarmed. Shoemaker frantically wired Crawford 
on the twenty-eighth announoins more depredations west of 
Harker and closing with the very decided deolaration that 
unless the road were promptly protected all the workers 
would.be driven off and all the citizens would be forced to 
33 
leave the region. 
Upon the receipt of Shoemaker's wire of June 21st, 
Governor Crawford leaped into action. His first efforts 
were directed toward getting arms and ammunition for the 
59. 
railroad workers. On the twenty-second he appealed to the 
War Department for two thousand stand of cavalry arms and 
34 
ammunition. Two days later he again wired Secretary Stanton 
asking him to direct immediately the commanding officer at 
Fort Leavenworth to turn the arms and ammunition over to the 
35 
State. Before sending this message to Stanton. the Kansas 
Executive had attempted to get ten thousand rounds of ammu-
36 
nition from Fort Leavenworth. Whether or not the arsenal 
had refused the request until otherwise instructed by
Stanton is not clear. The fact remains that on the same day, 
by Special Order No. 136, General Hancock direoted the com-
mander of the Leavenworth arsenal to issue ten thousand 
37 
rounds of 68 calibre cartridges for the State of Kansas. 
Cra\Vford asked only for ammunition from b\ort Leavenworth, 
stating that he had sufficient arms, yet on the same day he 
demanded both arms and ammunition of Stanton. This apparent 
1noone1stenoy may have been due to the excitement of the 
moment. Many of the guns needed were in possession of the 
militia; consequently, Crawford instructed Captain J. u. 
Haskell at Lawrence to oall in all the state and federal 
arms and ammunition in Lawrence and have one thousand stand 
38 
packed for immediate shipment. On June 28th the Governor 
wired Captain J. c. l'renoh at Fort Leavenworth to ship what 
39 
arms and ammunition he had as soon as possible. Shoemaker's 
men were thus provided with plenty of munitions within a few 
days after the sending of their appeal for protection. 
Simultaneous with his campaign to ~rovide arms for the 
60. 
railroad workers, Governor Crawford endeavored to gain per-
mission to organize a regiment of volunteer cavalry for 
service on tha frontier. In his telegram to Stanton on June 
24tht Crawford volunteered to raise such an organization. 
To give additional weight to his request the c;overnor en-
closed President Ferry's dispatch and added hie own observa-
tion that the railroad west of Fort Harker and all Kansas 
frontier settlements would have to be abandoned unless 
40
prompt-and decisive measures were taken. Stanton replied on 
June 27th, referrimg him to General Grant, Commander in Chief 
41' 
of the Army. Grant, naturally, turned the matter over to 
Sherman, who was commanding -the military Division of the 
Missouri .. 
Sherman wired Crawford on June 26th aooept1118 a bat-
talion of mounted volunteer~ provided that ueneral A. J. 
Smith at Fort Harker deemed them to be necessary. Sherman 
stipulated that the battalion should consist of six or eight 
42 companies to be used for four months. General Smith signi-
fied his consent the next day in a telegram to Crawford; 
however, on the twenty-eighth he informed the Governor that 
43
Sherman had countermanded the order. Shoemaker's message or 
the twenty-eighth also reported Sherman's change of mind. 
Crawford accordingly telegraphed Sherman and earnestly re-
, 
que.sted a reversal of his orders. In his plea the Governor 
said that it was impossible to move against the Indians with 44 
militia. As a result of this action, General Sherman again 
reversed his decision and on July 1st gave Crawford permission 
61. 
to raise the volunteer battalion. At once Governor Crawford 
issued a proclamation calling upon the people of·Iransas for 
volunteers. Thus the Eighteenth Kansas Cavalry came into 
45
existence. 
Why did General Sherman first consent.to the raising of 
the volunteer cavalry and then countermand the order shortly 
afterward? Apparently a conflict was going on in Sherman's 
mind between his personal views of the situation and his 
desire to cooperate with Crawford and the railroad officials. 
Sherman had little sympathy with the Indian, whom he oonsid-
46 · 
ered the enemy of civilization. At the same time he favored 
47
government protection for the transcontinental roads. Wb7 
then should he object to a proposition whereby the Union 
Paoifio Eastern Division should get immediate protection? 
Tho answer is that he was heartily opposed to the raising of 
volunteer troops by any state for the defense of_ite local 
interests, since all other states and territories that had 
aontaot with the .Indians would instantly start a clamor to 
48 
do likewise. It was his personal belief that each of the 
western states and territories wanted the entire United 
49 
states Army for its own protection. Sherman had stated his 
views quite plainly in a long telegram to Crawford on June 
twenty-fourth. The general tone of his message was a bit of 
advioe to Crawford to aot cautiously •. The complete text of 
the telegram is given below: 
"Your dispatch of today is this moment received. 
I had already committed myself to be in st. Louis 
tomorrow from Omaha. I mailed you a oiroular de-
fining as clearly as I oan express how far you 
can help us to maintain peace on the border. Thie 
oirou1ar you ought to receive today. Until Con-
gress gives to the military power the right to say 
what Indians are at peace and what at war, this 
conflict of races must go on. In the meantime I 
must leave to General Hanoook to do hie best. He 
is today at Denver, will start back on the Smoky 
Hill on the· 27th and should reach Fort Harker and 
the telegraph in ten days. The Indiana thus tar 
seem to confine tneir attacks to isolated trains 
and to the roads and are in small bands strung 
from. • • Minnesota to • • • Texas. Yet almost 
every Indian Agent says his particular Indians are 
at home and at peaoe. If you choose to organize a 
battalion of volunteers, say six or eight compan-
ies, and offer them to Gen. Hancock on hie arrival 
at Fort Harker, if he wants them I will approve, 
but my notion is he has troops enough. If we can 
only see where the Indians will turn up, which 
seems impossible. I prefer you deal with Gen. 
50
Hanoook as he is on the spot all the time." 
62. 
Having yielded to the insistence of Crawford and the rail-
road people, however, Sherman came to Kansas immediately in 
order to be near the scene of action. 
'63. 
When General Sherman reached Fort Harker in July to 
investigate the Indian situation, railroad construotion was 
advancing at a slow rate. while transportation from "End of 
Traok'' to Denver on the Smoky Hill Stage Line was virtually 
suspended. Only two stages had passed'through to Denver 
during the previous month, and none had made the attempt in 
51 . 
July up to the time of his arrival. Sherman at once looked 
into the matter. The result was a startling discovery which, 
if known sooner, likely would have forced him to withhold 
permanently hie ooneent to the organization of the Eighteenth 
Kansas Cavalry. Sherman, upon investigation, was convinced 
that Indian depredations were not -~he real reason for .the 
suspension either of railroad building or of travel on the 
Smoky Hill Stage Line. He contended instead 'that the rail-
road was delayed by excessive rainfall, while the stage line 
did not operate due to selfishness and cowardice on the part 
62
of the stage company officials. The General was also led to 
suspect strongly that Kansas.newspapers and citizens were 
exaggerating Indian rumors. His natural oonolusion, accord-
ingly, was that neither Kansas nor the railroad and stage 
line needed the protection whioh they had gained as the 
result or Governor Crawford's persistent efforts. 
Following hie investigation of the Smoky Hill Stage 
situation Sherman transmitted a telegram to Crawford in 
which he condemned the stage company in no uncertain terms 
tor its failure to operate. 
"I believe," said Sherman, "there are other causes 
than Indians why the Smoky Hill Stage has not run. 
The railroad was delayed by high water and not by
Indians and the stages have stopped for want of 
connection and because it is not profitable. I 
want both railroad and stage companies to prosper 
but cannot excuse them from doing their share of 
service unless they make efforts equal to the 
occasion. All our Posts and intermediate stations 
to Denver are safe. Trains of wagons go with 
light escort and even single carriers run from 
post to post. General Smith has offered the stage 
Company any amount of gua~d but they wont go. 
Keep this to yourself only help me quiet down 
unnecessary alarm, which as you can see often 
does as much harm as real danger, and of course 
all parties having close contracts avail them-
selves ot the alarm to avoid services and claim 
53 
compensation and damage •• •" 
64. 
Two days later, Sherman informed Crawford that the Eighteenth 
.
Cavalry was being mustered-in at Fort Harker and that a com-
pany each of infantry and cavalry had been assigned to guard 
Shoemaker's construction trains. "The Conqueror of Atlanta" 
then closed with this statement: 
"Though I assert that Indians have not delayed the 
progress of this road one hour. The stage company 
deserves severe treatment for their efforts to 
avoid their contract and they may be the means 
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of breaking up the Smoky Hill line altogether.n 
The stage company referred to by General Sherman was 
Wells, Fargo and Company, who had bought out the Holladay 
interests in 1866 and had perfected a merger of several 
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mail, express and stage lines. 
65. 
Sherman's indictment was not the only one hurled at the 
company. Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, while attempting to 
defend Wells, Fargo and Company before the Senate, unwit-
tingly let fall information which supported Sherman's con-
tention. Pomeroy and Thayer of Nebraska were deny1Jl8 the 
oft• repeated accusation of eastern papers that the oon-
traotors of the West wanted an Indian war. In the oourse 
of debate, Pomeroy stated that, due to Indian raids, Wells, 
Fargo was losing money daily in the performance of their 
United States Y.:a.11 contraot and that they would give a mil-
56 
lion dollars to get out of it. This in itself is an indica-
tion that the company was not overly eager to continue 
operations on the Smoky Hill Route during June and July. 
From still another source, Sherman's criticism is sub-
stantiated. Postmaster General Alex W'. Randall, in his 
report for 1867, mentioned a similar denouncement of Wells, 
Fargo as follows: 
nnur1ng the spring and summer months the com-
plaints as to the manner in which the service was 
being performed, and the great delay in the 
arrival of mail from the East at Denver ••• were 
more numerous than at any time since the present 
route has been in operation. It was charged that 
the Indian troubles, complained of by the contract-
or and given by his agents as an excuse tor non-
performance ot service, were a pretence, and that 
this was no reason why the mails should not be 
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conveyed regularly and within schedule time." 
66. 
The Postmaster General concluded, on the other hand, that 
the contractor (Wells, Fargo and Co.) was not to blame for 
the delay in service. The Indian situation on the Plaine, 
he decided, was really serious. As proot for this final 
conclusion, he cited official reports to the War Department 
. 58 
by General Sherman and other army officers. It is evident 
that the Postmaster General knew nothing of Sherman's reve-
lations to Crawford concerning the refusal of the stage 
company to resume service even under heavy escort. 
Western transportation companies undoubtedly did take 
advantage of the United States Government duriDS this period. 
By the nature of their oontraots they could oolleot their 
money whether or not they maintained an unbroken schedule. 
Regardless of the motives of the stage company, whether it 
was to make money ~1th a minimum amount of eftort, as im-
plied by Sherman, or to keep from losing money, as asserted 
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by Pomeroy, the fact remains that service was intentionall7 
suspended tor several weeks on the Smoky Hill line. 
There is, of course, some evidence to Justify the stage 
company tor discontinuing its service. A special corres-
pondent of the Leavenworth Conservative, located at·Fort 
Wallace with a railroad engineering expedition, declared 
that the route was closed because the troops for its p~o-
teotion had been sent to guard the Platte line. The writer 
was highly indignant because the interests of the Smoky Hill 
line were saor1fioed for those of the Platte. This corres-
pondent, in two separate articles, maintained that the stage 
stations were being attacked daily and that during the month 
ot June $100,000 worth of property was destroyed besides 
many lives being lost. An aooount of an Indian raid at Pond 
Creelc station was also given. Even Fort Wallace was attacked 
on June twenty-first by about three hundred Indians, accord-
ing to the writer. The article of July second stated that 
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the fort was still besieged. Practically the same assertions 
were made by General w. w. Wright, Chief Engineer of the 
Union Paoifio Ea.stern Division, in a report to President 
John D. Perry on June 29th. wright was commander of the 
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engineering expedition at Fort Wallace. 
The truth of the whole matter probably is that during 
the Indian raids ot the latter part of June the stage oom-
~any offioials had reason for closing down; but that in the 
early part of July, when traffic should have been resumed, 
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they tailed to perform their duty. 
Another problem with which General Sherman had to con-
tend was that or false reports and rumors of Indian upris-
ings. His personal attitude toward this question was well 
expressed in his telegram to Governor Crawford on July eighth 
in which he requested that Crawford help him to quiet down 
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unnecessary alarm. In a letter to his brother, the General 
denounced the publication of rumors. "Not only real depre-
dations are committed" (by the Indians), he asserted, "but 
every fear, or apprehension, on whatever it may be founded, 
is published, and protection claimed and demanded.". Further 
on in the letter, Sherman emphasized that faot that the 
olamor of the people for protection really weakened the 
military power in the region since it necessitated breakins 
up hie· forces into small groups. Thia, he declared, prevent-
ed the collection of any large army to carry an offensive 
into the Indiana' own country, the Yellowstone and Red River 
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localities. 
Sherman's contention that rumors were harmful was up-
held by the Fort Harker correspondent to the Leavenworth 
Conservative. In an article to his paper on July a, 1867, 
the writer complained about the false propaganda which was 
being circulated by a rival paper, the Leavenworth Commer-
~· The writer for the Conservative denied that there was 
any truth to the recent stories of Indian raids near Ells-
worth. He added that between Harker and Hays all was quiet. 
69. 
Beyond that point he had no information since, for some 
reason unknown to the people of his vicinity, the stage had 
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not oome through from the west for some time. 
After General Sherman had returned to st. Louis, the 
Republican of that city printed an article from Fort Harker 
which reported the massacre near Fort Larned of a part1 of 
Catholic priests and nuns. Sherman at once published a 
reply denyillB the truth of the incident and rebuking news-
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paper Journalists for publishing unfounded rumors. It was 
later proved that the article was false. The story of the 
massacre had been published by a Leavenworth rival of the 
Conservative. The editor or the Conservative, although 
stating.that he had not printed. the report, denied that the 
nowspnpere of Kansas were publishing exaggerated storie·s. 
At the same time he warned his readers to beware of· Indian 
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news printed in any rival Leavenworth papers. 
Additional proof that one of the Leavenworth papers was 
guilty of "yellow Journalism" comes from an entirely differ-
ent sou.roe. A prominent official of the Union Pacific East-
ern Division, writing in September, 1867, reported that 
Ellsworth was a great place for the manufacture of news. He 
also mentioned that a reporter for a Leavenworth Journal was 
tilling his paper with startling accounts of Indian raids 
and horrible murders which were be11'.l8 copied by "all the 
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eastern papers as the true state of affairs in the West." 
While the Sherman investigation and newspaper controversy 
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were taking plaoe, the Eighteenth Kansas cavalry was organ-
ized, mustered into service and baptized with fire. "ben 
Governor Crawford issued hie call for volunteers on July 
first, it was his intention to raise eight oompanies of 
cavalry for six months service. As a matter of faot only 
four companies were raised and the regiment was required to 
serve only four months. The reason for this change of plane 
will soon be apparent. 
Recruiting officers soon found that they could get 
plenty of men but very few horses. Crawford on JU.ly third 
asked Sherman if the Government would furnish horses tor 
part of the men. Sherman refused, stating that if eight 
·mounted companies could not be furnished a less number would 
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be sufficient. Telegrams and letters literally poured into 
the executive offices in Topeka. during the next few days. 
The ma.Jority of these were in regard to getting horses. 
Accordingly, Crawford on July tenth again telegraphed Sher-
man inquiring if he would take part of the men unmounted. 
Sherman again rejected the suggestion, remarkill8 that if the 
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men could not be mounted they were not wanted. This atti-
tude of Sherman was quite disoonoerting to certain Kansans 
who were striving mightily to organize a full eight-oompany-
regiment. On July fifth, Governor Crawford received the 
following telegram from A. Green of Manhattan: 
"I can get horses if AdJutant General will issue 
certificate of indebtedness. Pottawatomie is best 
place. I came up with General Sherman. He would 
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!!,2! grieve!! you£!!!. Come up tomorrow." 
71 •. 
Aooording to the terms of enlistment, each volunteer 
was supposed to furnish his own horse. He was then to be 
armed. equipped and paid by the United States as were other 
regular troops. In oase a volunteer had no horse and was 
unable to purchase one the State guaranteed to stand seour-
70 
ity for the payment. In order to pay all creditors for 
horses purchased without waiting for a delayed legislative 
appropriation, the recruits gave their personal notes at 
the time of purchase. The recruiting officer was then in-
structed to draw the cash pay of each soldier so indebted 
and transmit it to the creditor until the note wae paid in 
'• ,,71 
full. The Governor assured all questioners that each sol-
dier who :rurn1shed a horse would be reimbursed later by
legislative appropriation. 
With the horse problem. once solved, the routine of 
organization went on steadily. Hy the fifteenth of July the 
Eighteenth Kansas was mustered into United States service at 
Fort Harker. i1he battalion was made up of four companies 
with a total enrollment of three hundred fifty-eight officers 
'12.
and enlisted men. That there was a real need for the regi-
ment was revealed by General Sherman in his annua1 report 
tor the year. The report explained that the Eighteenth was 
called into service to replace six companies of Seventh Cav-




Under the able leadership of llaJor Horace L. Moore ot 
Lawrence, the Eighteenth Kansas performed oreditably and was 
ot real service to the State and ~ation. In addition to 
fighting the Indians, the men faoed a far deadlier enemy, 
cholera, which took a heavy toll of recruits at Fort Harker, 
on July 24th the regiment was at Fort Larned. Shortly after-
ward it was moved to Fort Dodge and finally to Fort Hays on 
August 16th. While stationed at Hays the Eighteenth per-
formed its most active service. On Ausust twenty-second, 
part of the regiment participated in the Battle of Beaver 
Creek. Following an Indian raid on the Smoky Hill Stage 
Line at Big Creek Station, Ua.Jor Armes organized an expedi-
tion of Tenth United States and Eighteenth Kansas cavalry 
and pursued the hostiles north into the Republican Valley. 
While out on a scout for the expedition, Captain Jenness ot 
the Eighteenth Kansas and a small body of troops were at-
tacked by about five hundred Indians. They withstood the 
onslaught until rescued by Ma~or Armes and the main body. 
The Indians then attacked the entire foroe. The battle 
raged for six hours before darkness caused the fighting to 
cease. Satanta, the Kiowa chief, was reported to have led 
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the Indians. The soldiers' losses were three killed and 
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thirty-five wounded. Meanwhile, VaJor Moore and the balance 
of the Eighteenth were campaigning in the same general re-
gion. Although neither Indians nor soldiers oould olaim 
decisive victories the campaign had the effeot of break1118 
up the Indian concentration alo.cg the Smoky Hill and the 
'13. 
Republican. The northern Indians retreated to the north 
while the Comanches, Kicwas, southern Cheyennes and Arapa-
hoes headed south, where the7 met the Peaoe Commission at 
'16
Medicine Lodge in Ootober. The Eighteenth continued to 
serve until Ootober 29th, v,hen 1 t was ordered to b.,ort Ha.1•ker 
to be mustered out. On November 15th the final muster took 
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plaae. It waa deemed unnecessary to keep the soldiers in 
service for six months, since there was r10 need for them 
during the winter. About ten per oent of the regiment lost 
their lives during their four months service. 
Throll8hout the months of July and AUBUst, reports ot 
Indian depredations had continued to come in. A perfect 
reign of terror took place in Colorado Territory during the 
early part of July. settlers left the country, and there 
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was talk of discontinuing overland travel. One ot Ouster's 
eooute, in relatine the story of the Kidder Massacre and an 
attack by Indians on Custer's supply train. closed the inter-
view with these words: 
"If any man thinks there is no war with, or 
da?J8er from the Indians,. let him make a trip 
from Wallace to ttarker and then he will realize 
'19
it." 
service wae finally resumed on the Smoky Hill Route during 
the last days 1n July. On the twenty-seventh, the first 
west-bound mail ooaoh reached Denver after a ten~day tri» 
from Fort Harker. Indians were numerous between Marker and 
Monument Station end, according to reports, were v1rtua1ly 
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in possession of one hundred miles of the road. Santa Fe 
coaches, on the other hand, were coming throlJ8h to Fort 
Harker unmolested tho'U8h many Indians were seen along the 
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route. 
Osages dwelling in the southeast section of the state 
caught the fever of the Indian war on the Plaine and per-
formed some minor depredations. Governor Crawford paid them 
a visit in August and called them to account for thieving of 
horses and other stock from settlers •. The Osages promptly 
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returned the property and thereafter remained "Good Indiana". 
The Governor discovered that Indian traders were daily sup-
plyi?J8 the Osages as well as the wild Plains tribes with 
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arms and ammunition. 
The Indian Peace Commission, which had been appointed 
in July by aot of Congress, held a meeting in st. Louis on 
August eighth. As a result General Sherman ordered all de-
partment commanders in the Division of the Missouri to 
assume defensive tactics only, thus giving the Indians a 
chance to receive the messages sent out from the Peace Com-
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mission and to act on them. In a telegram to General Han-
cock more explicit directions were given. Hancock was 
instructed to send out orders to all posts that, when the 
cavalry parties stil1 out came in, they defend the Platte 
and Smoky Hill routes as well as possible and only pursue 
parties that had committed recent outrages. Sherman reit-
erated his decision to give the Indians a fair chance to 
make peace with the Commission. He also condemned the act 
of the superintendent of Indian Affairs at Oma.ha. for grant-
ing permits to the Pawnee, Omaha and Spotted Tail Sioux 
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tribes for buffalo hunting on the Republican. Hancock en-
closed a copy of Sherman's instructions in a letter to 
Crawford explaining that they indicated the future course 
wbioh the military were to pursue between the Smoky Hill and 
Republican. Referrill8 to the Beaver Creek conflict, Hancock 
said, "Captain Armes was out and had not received the dis•. 
patch or he would have had no fight. Of course MaJor Moore, 
and MaJor Elliot acted correctly in going to the enemy under 
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the oiroumstanoes." 
In view of this change of tactics upon the part of the 
military authorities, matters became somewhat complicated 
when the Indians again attacked the Smoky Hill Route in 
September. Shoemaker wired Crawford on the twenty-first 
informing him that one of the principal contractors and 
three men were killed by Indians on the nineteenth. Since 
General Smith at Fort Harker could give no additional pro-
tection the general superintendent asked the Governor for 
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an infantry regiment at once to guard the working parties. 
Crawford replied immediately, "Your dispatch received. Will 
tender regiment to General Sherman. If he will not accept 
on behalf of Government, I will endeavor to make other 
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arraneements.n Governor Crawford then made a speedy trip 
to Fort Hays to investigate matters and upon his return sent 
two telegrams to Sherman describing the situation and 
'16. 
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offering to organi.ze immediately a regiment of volwiteere. 
Sherman's reply threw cold water on the proposition. 
The complete telegram follows: 
Gov. Crawford: 
IIeadquarters, Military Di vision 
of the Missouri, 
st. Louis, Sept. 24, 1867. 
With the present convictions of the Indian 
Commission to be at Fort Harker the eighth I 
would not be willing to aooept more volunteers. 
Mr. Shoemaker ought not to push his parties too 
tar out till we meet the Cheyennes. 
w. T. Sherman 
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Lieut. General. 
Sherman thus remained consistent with his previous pos-
ition. Crawford, plainly, was out of sympathy with the 
Peace Commission and considered defense of the railroad 
paramount. The crux of the matter was whether or not the 
road actually needed more protection than it was already 
getting. One wonders what the ~ighteenth Kansas was doins 
at the time. Considerable light is shed on the question by
lEr. llarshall, who was on the scene at Fort Harker as a rep-
resentative of the railroad's eastern financial interests. 
Writing from Junction City on September eighteenth, Uarshall 
explained that he had Just gone up to the end of the track 
with the railroad commissioners, that a military escort had 
accompanied the train and that they were not molested- Fur-
ther on he states: 
"The Indiana west of us have been making some 
trouble lately, but I do not apprehend any trouble 
with our trains. There have been several attacks 
made on wagon trains and some stock stolen, and a 
few men killed, but those things you must expect 
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when you pass over other peoples grounds." 
The ~eace Commission, following its meeting in St. 
Louie. headed northwest up the Missouri River in order to 
treat with the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes before meeting 
the tribes in Kansas. Sherman invited Crawford to meet the 
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Commission at Fort Leavenworth on August eleventh. Crawford 
aooepted and presented his views to the commissioners. A 
Leavenworth daily, reporting the Governor's presence in town, 
had this to say: "The Governor will confer with the Peace 
Pow-wow-1sts, but is not known to sympathize with their pol-
93 
1oy. He is for extortiDB peace. We guess." In September, 
Crawford further vented his opinion of the Commission. "I 
am waiting patiently," he wrote, "the result of the efforts 
of this peace commission. If they fail to do their duty the 
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State of Kansas will not fail." Sherman also was not optim-
istio about the possibility of peace, although he expressed 
some hopes. Writing to his brother on September 28th, he 
predicted that the Indian wars were not over, since it would 
take years for the Peace Commission to fulfill the require-
95
ments of the law »assed by CoJ'l6ress. 
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In October the Peace Commission arrived in Kansas. Its 
personnel had been carefully chosen by CoJ18ress from both 
military men and civilians. Generals Terry, Harney, Sanborn 
and Auger represented the army, while Commissioner Taylor 
upheld the interests of the Indian Bureau. Senator Hender-
son of Missouri represented Congress, and Colonel Samuel 
Tappan stood for the nation at large. For a month prior to 
the meeting the Indian Bureau ha.d been assembling a vast 
amount of material near Medicine Lodge to give the Indiana 
as presents. These stores included ootfee, sugar, flour, 
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dried fruits, arms and ammunition and a herd ot oattle. 
Once the Indians were assembled, the pow-wow.began. 
Estimates of the number of Indians present vnry :t'rom five 
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thousand to fifteen thousand. The tribes represented wore 
the Cheyenne. Arapahoe, Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache. 
Tall Bull, a prominent Cheyenne war chief, ably stated the 
Indian's case when he told the commissioners that the red 
men·were on the warpath to prevent Kansas and Colorado beill8 
settled by pale-faces. He said that the Indians olaimed 
that part or the country as their own, and did not want 
railroads built through it to scare away the buffalo. At 
one time during the early stages of the conference it seemed 
that negotiations would stop and a general massacre ensue. 
Since there were less than five hundred soldiers present, 
the commissioners exhibited some uneasiness. Nevertheless, 
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the Indians were kept in awe by a show of artillery, so the 
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pow-wow continued. 
Two treaties were drawn up and signed. On October 
twenty-first, the commissioners reached their final agree-
ment with the Comanche, Kiowas and Apaches. The Cheyennes 
held off until a week later, when they and their Arapahoe 
allies came to terms. The two treaties were nearly identi-
cal in make-up. Aooord1ng to the final arrangement the 
Indians agreed to: 
(l) Withdraw all opposition to the oonstruotion of 
the Pacific railroads. 
(2) Relinquish their claims to the land lying be-
tween the Platte and Arkansas. 
(3) Withdraw to reservations set apart.for them. 
In return the Indians received the followi11g concessions: 
(1) A large reservation and an enormous amount of 
supplies. (The Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches 
were assigned to a reserve north of the Red 
River. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were al-
lotted about three million acres in the Cher-
okee outlet in Indian Territory.) 
(2) The right to hunt south of the Arkansas River 
so long as the buffalo ranged there in such 
numbers as to justify the chase. No white 
. settlements were to be allowed between the 
i\rkansae River and the southern boundary of 
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Kansas for a period of three years. 
so. 
Contrary to a general impression which has grown up in 
the Unites States, the Medicine Lodge Treaty did not bring 
peace to the frontier. After loading the Indians up with 
guns and ammunition the Peace Commission promised to provide 
more for them the next spring. This mistaken policy on the 
part of the commissioners practically undid everyth111g that 
had been aooompliehed by the treaty. It remained tor the 
military authorities to bring about peace by conquest in 
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1868. Even- from the standpoint of the Indian, the treaty 
was a failure. "The giving of a tew presents and the sign-
ing of treaties by a few chiefs would not appease the 
Indians, whose livelihood, the buffalo, was beins destroyed 
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and driven away.rr The young men of all the tribes bitterly 
opposed the treaty; hence it could not be expected that the 
terms of the agreement would be observed. 
After the break-up of the great lledioine Lodge encamp-
ment, the Indians headed south and west leavins the Kansas 
frontier in peace during the fall and winter. Sheridan, 
upon taking command of the Department of the Missouri, re-
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ported everything comparatively quiet. At the very close of 
the year reports reached Topeka or Indian depredations on 
White Rock Creek in Republic County. These proved to be the 
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work of a party of Omahas and Otoes. 
The year 1867 was outstanding in the annals or Plains 
81. 
warfare. Commencing early in the spriDB, the war between 
Indians and whites dragged through a long summer and well 
into ,the autumn. While no general massaore of settlers took 
plaoe, there were over four hundred citizens murdered by the 
southern tribes in Kansas and Nebraska during 1866 and 186~. 
Sixteen engagements occurred during the latter year between 
Indians and United States troops in the Missouri department. 
So numerous indeed were the conflicts on the Plains that one 
writer has credited the summer of 1867 with more actual cav-
alry fighting than any season in the ten years of Plains 
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oombat from 1864 to 1874. While this statement may be cor-
rect, it is well to add that the confliots between the mili-
tary and Indians during the year were not especially bloody. 
In the entire Department of the Missouri during 1867 nine-
teen soldiers were killed.and fifty wounded, while only ten 
105 




THE INDIAN WARS OF 1868-1869 
Part One, 1868 
Indian affairs in Kansas remained unusually quiet in 
the spring of 1868. Nothing of note happened until the 
early part of June, when the Cheyennes raided Council Grove. 
Minor depredations ooourred during July followed by an in-
vasion of the Saline and Solomon valleys in A\18ust. On 
August twenty-third, General Sheridan ordered the Indians 
out of the State. While a volunteer battalion patrolled the 
frontier districts, Sheridan organized hie regulars and car-
ried on a fall and winter campaign into the Indian's strong-
hold in the Indian Territory and Texas. The result was the 
complete subdua.l of the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and 
Kiowa tribes. Sheridan's forces were ably assisted in this 
campaign by the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry. 
Before any critical estimate can be made ot Sheridan's 
campaign, it is necessary to return to the events which led 
up to that final crushing of the Plains tribes in Kansas. 
In the spring of 1868 the nomadic Indian tribes had gone 
into camp near Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, where they pro-
ceeded to draw rations from the Government until the buffalo 
migration reached the Kansas plains. The Kiowas, Comanches 
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and part ot the Cheyennes located at Larned, while the Arapa-
hoes, Apaches and the balance of the Cheyennes chose Fort 
l 
Dodge. Duri.ng this period General Sheridan endeavored to 
establish a more friendly basis for Indian relations~ In an 
ettort to explain further the terms of the Medicine Lodge 
treaties, special agents had been sent among the tribes the 
previous autumn. William Comstock and Abner s. Grover were 
dispatched to the Cheyennes and Richard Parr to the Kiowas 
and Comanches. For a time it seemed that success would 
orown their efforts, but by the following spring it became 
apparent that the Cheyennes were not to be reconciled so 
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easily. Comstock and Grover were treacherously attacked, 
Comstock losing his life as a result. General Sheridan pow-
wowed with the Indians at Fort Dodge but gained little sat-
isfaction. The young men were extremely dissatisfied with 
the Medicine Lodge arrangements and were in an ugly mood. 
Warriors, chiefs, medicine men, all the tribal leaders, made 
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one demand--arms and ammunition. 
The problem involved was a thorny one which remained 
unsolved from the previous year. In January, 1867, General 
Sherman had ordered General Ha.noook to stop the practice of 
Indian agents selling arms to the Indians. All sales by law 
wore to be under the rigid control of the commanding offi-
cers ot posts within the Indian distriots. The law was 
being flagrantly violated, however. Sherman threatened, 
consequently, to withdraw United states troops from the 
plains region altogether unless the unlimited and unlicensed 
84. 
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sale of arms stopped. Sherman appealed to Grant, who in 
turn, addressed the Secretary of War, urg1Jl8 the abolition 
f>
ot civil Indian agents and licensed traders. Grant also 
seconded Sherman's threat to withdraw the troops from the 
frontier. Since the problem involved a conflict between the 
War Department and the Interior Department, which contained 
the Indian Bureau, Congress became the final authority. On 
February l, 1861, Secretary Stanton transmitted to the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs a letter i"rom MaJor Douglas, 
commander at Fort Dodge. Doll8las had reported that a large 
trading business had grown up at the fort between traders 
and Indians, that EutteTfield, the former head of the Over-
land Dispatch, had the largest investment of all the traders, 
and that several caees of arms had been sold by Butterfield 
to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. "Between the authorized 
issue of the agents and the sales of the traders," said 
DolJ8las,. rrthe Indians were never better armed than at the 
present time." Continuing, the letter related that the In-
dians were openly boasting of their preparedness for war in 
the spring. Further 1norimina.t1.ng statements were made by
MaJor Douglas. 
"The agents have no real control over the traders; 
in faot, they are accused by many, both Indians 
and white men, of being in league with them, and 
of drawing a large profit from the trade. The 
anxiety of the Indians at the present time to 
obtain arms and ammunition is a great temptation 
to the trader. For a revolver an Indian will give 




It developed that Butterfield had consulted experienced 
Indian agents before selling arms to the Indians. William 
H. Bent, E. w. Wynooop, and Colonel J. H. Leavenworth had 
addressed a oiroular letter to the new trader informing him 
that he was authorized to sell arms or ammunition to any In-
dians that were at peace with and receiving annuities from 
7
the United States. Feeling that he had received official 
consent, Butterfield aooordingly went ahead with his sales, 
sinoe the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were receiving annuities 
and so were technically at peace. 
While Congress we.a debating the question in committee, 
the practice of evading the law continued. Governor Craw-
ford, while in Washington in April, 1867, visited the Inter-
ior Department and roundly denounced it for supplying the 
Indians with arms and ammunition to be used against frontier 
people. The Secretary promised that arms would not be issued 
to the tribes that were on the warpath. This promise was 
8 '
then immediately broken. Indian supplies were sent to At-
ohison in July consigned to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who 
were on the warpath. Hearing of the presence of the supply 
train in Kansas, Governor Crawford telegraphed General Sher-
man and threatened to have it burned unless the War Depart-
ment prevented the supplies from reaching the Indians. 
86. 
Sherman therefore ordered the cavalry from Fort Riley to 
oapture the train and store the supplies in Fort Larned. 
There they remained until October, when the Peaoe Commission 
9
distributed them to the Indians at Medicine Lodge. When 
these and other supplies provided by the commissioners were 
exhausted, six wagon loads more ot revolvers were supplied 
10 
from Fort Harker. 
His indignation once aroused, Crawford was relentless 
in his persecution of Indian traders and agents. Having 
learned that one of Colonel Leavenworth's traders at Wichita 
was supplying the K1owas and Comanches with arms and ammuni-
tion, the Governor made a public statement denouncing such 
practices. The trader, J. R. Mead, then wrote Crawford in 
a.n aggrieved tone. denying everything. Crawford sent a 
scorching reply on September fourth. Extracts from the let-
ter follow: 
"You, I um informed, are one of his (Leavenworth's 
traders. If such be the :fact, it is doubtless to 
your mutual interest to cooperate with each other 
in explaining and covering up as far as possible 
the damnable outrages committed by agent traders 
and Indiana during the present year." 
The Governor then proceeded to tell l.!ead that arms ~nd ammu-
nition had been passing into the Indian Country all summer 
by way of the mouth of the Little Arkansas. Crawford warned 
Mead not to ship any more arms to the Indians, and closed 
with this: 
"The Kiowa or Comanche Indian who has committed 
most fiendish outrages in Kansas is no worse than 
his agent who represents him as at peace, or the 
trader who furnishes him with supplies which en-
11 
able hlm to execute his designs." 
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With the history of the previous year as a warning, 
General Sheridan refused to deliver more arms to the Indians 
in the spring of 1868. 
The month of June, 1868, brought the biggest Indian 
soare that Kansas ever witnessed. On June third, citizens 
ot V.arion County and vicinity received warning that a large 
band of Indians was approachill8• Settlers from miles around 
flocked into town for protection. The Indians appeared, 
some three hundred strong, but passed by the frightened town 
without molesting it • .Farm houses were ransacked and stock 
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killed by the invaders. The objective of this Cheyenne raid 
was the Kaw Indian Reservation at Council Grove. on June 
fifth the Cheyennes arrived and attacked the Kawa. After a 
long drawn out battle in which few fatalities ooourred, the 
Cheyennes were driven off and headed westward, committing 
petty outrages as they went. 
Quite nat~ally the entire east-central portion of the 
state was aroused. Armed bodies of citizens instantly col-
leoted in Morris, Lyon, and Chase Counties, but the men were 
88. 
entirely without organization and recognized no one as com-
13 
mander •. Not knowing where the Indians would strike next, 
the suspense was terrible to the people in the region. Et-
forts to allay their fears were made by the newspapers. It 
was soon discovered that the Cheyenne raid was aimed only at 
the Kaws, and that the motive back of it was retaliation tor 
tha death of seven Cheyennes at the hands of the Kaws the 
14 
previous summer. 
The oh1ef result of the raid was that tho state govern-
ment, in cooperation with the Department of the Missouri, 
evolved a more effective system of frontier·proteotion. Ao 
an emergency measure, General Sheridan dispatched onvalry 
16 
from Forts Harker and Riley to the Council Grove vicinity. 
On June eighth the General ordered that fifteen thousand 
rounds of ammunitions be shipped to Governor Crawford tor 
16 
distribution among the frontier settlers. Four days later, 
Yr. McAfee, AdJutant General of ICansas, left Topeka in order 
to distribute the ammunition and arms provided by Sheridan. 
McAfee also had instructions to organize a company of reserve 
17 
cavalry. 
For permanent protection of the western border Sheridan 
decided to organize a cavalry patrol by establishing tempor-
ary camps in the exposed region. Prior to the raid, a cav-
alry company had been stationed at the mouth of the Little 
18 
.Arkansas. on June twentieth Sheridan informed Crawford that 
another company had been posted at the Kaw Crossing of the 
89. 
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Santa Fe Trail on the Cottonwood River near Marion •. The two 
oompanies in oooperation with the troops at Fort Harker thus 
patrolled the border from Harker south to Wichita. 
11hese precautions were in line with the demands of the 
settlers of the region and accomplished a great deal toward 
relieving their anxiety. The War Department also aided by
issuing an order directing the commanders of departments to 
use their own Judgment in issuing ammunition to state and 
20 
territorial authorities for frontier protection. It suited 
the people of Kansas to have this power in the hands of Gen-
eral Sheridan rather than the War Department, since they had 
great confidence in the good Judgment and cooperative spirit 
of "Little Phil". 
Tall Bull's Council Grove raid proved costly to the 
Cheyennes because it prevented them from collecting their 
annuity arms and ammunition for a time. By the middle of 
July, however, the Indians appeared in large numbers at Fort 
Larned and threatened to storm the fort and take the arms by
21 
force. Had not General sully maintained a bold front the 
22 
hostiles might have carried their threats into action. Fin-
ally the tribes deserted the fort, but the general impres-
sion among military officers was that they intended to return 
after placing their women and children in positions of safe-
23 
ty. Shortly afterwards, the Indians came back. This time, 
by astute diplomacy, they were able to get the desired arms. 
They promised to use the arms for hunting purposes only, 
90. 
claiming that they needed more ammunition in order to hunt 
on their way south in the autumn. General Sully was com-
pletely hoodwinked by their fair promises and aocord1Jl817 
issued the arms. By August third the last of the arms were 
24
distributed. Immediately the Indiana left tor parts unknown. 
At the first hint of trouble, Colonel Thomas Murphy, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Central Superintend-
ency had gone to Larned to investigate the situation. lie 
found the Indians cross and sullen because of the non-deliv-
ery of arms and ammunition. When he left, conditions were 
quiet. Colonel Murphy, therefore, was able to announce to 
the press of August fifth that an Indian outbreak was un-
likely to occur and that the Indians were convinced of their 
25 
own inability to continue hostilities against the whites. 
While the Colonel was publishing this statement, a band of 
approximately two hundred Cheyennes were on the warpath under 
the command of the Dog Soldier ohiet, Red Nose, and The-man-
who-breaks-the-marrow-bones, a prominent member of Blaok 
Kettle's band. Nearly all.the Cheyenne bands were represent-
26 
ed in the war party. Beginning on the Smoky Hill Valley and 
Kansas Pacific Railroad, the Indians swept northward to the 
Saline and thence to the Solomon and Republican Valleys. In 
the course of a few days time they had killed at least a 
dozen settlers, outraged several women, some of whom were 
carried into captivity, burned and ransacked houses, stolen 
stock, driven hundreds of settlers from the region and com-
27 
pletely paralyzed Northern Kansas with fright. 
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First news of the raid reached Topeka on August fif-
teenth. Colonel MoAfee and Governor Crawford immediately 
left for the exposed regions in order to make preparations 
tor arming and organizing the settlers for defense. Fortun-
ately for the Asher Creek settlement, Colonel McAfee had 
delivered them a shipment of arms before the raid. They 
were thus able to drive the Indians away. McAfee toured the 
settlements for several days, organizing, armi?J8 and provid-
28 
ing for the destitute. All attempts at pursuing the raiders 
tailed. Governor Crawford hastily organized a volunteer 
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company at Salina, but it was too late to accomplish much. 
On the seventeenth, Crawford appealed to President Johnson 
tor aid. In his message the Governor asked not only for aid 
but requested: (l) That the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, 
Cheyennes, and Apaches be driven from Kansas; (2) That the 
President keep the Indian Commission at home; (3) That the 
Government stop issuing arms and ammunition to the Indians. 
Crawford promised the cooperation of Kansas in any effort to 
drive the Indiana from the State. His message was referred 
30 
to General Sherman, who ordered immediate action. Regular 
troops were rushed to the scene of the raids by command of 
General Sheridan. Troops stationed on the Little Arkansas 
and detachments from Forts Riley and Harker were at once 
31 
transferred to the Saline and Solomon region. Sheridan then 
ordered General Sully to erect block houses on the Saline, 
Solomon, and Republican. These forts were garrisoned with 
infantry, while the region lying between the posts was 
92. 
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patrolled by cavalry. On AUBuet twenty-first, Sheridan in-
formed.Crawford that he was going to order all the Indians 
33 
to their reservations. The order was issued two days later. 
After a week of intense exoitement, Kansans realized 
that the worst was over. Settlers aooordi.ngly returned to 
their claims and life went on ae before. About the only 
beneficial result of the raid was that the settlers and the 
. .
military beoame better prepared to withstand any future In-
dian depredations in the region. By October the inhabitnnts 
of North-central Kansas were so destitute as a result of 
Indian raids and orop failures that it became neoeesnry to 
send them financial relief. Various organizations in the 
eastern part of the State put on campaigns and raised funds 
that these pioneers might remain on their claims throlJ8h the 
34 
winter. 
Governor Crawford's appeal to the President evidently 
produced results. The War Department was given a free hand 
to prosecute the Indian war to a finish. Even the Commis-
35 
eioner of Indian Affairs approved of punishing the guilty. 
The Indians in September resumed their depredations in earn-
est. Comanches and Kiowas made a dash at Fort Dodge on 
September third, killing tour soldiers and wounding seven-
ZG 
teen before being driven off. A Mexican wagon train wa.s 
attacked on the Santa Fe Trail near Fort Dodge by Cheyenne 
and .Arapahoes. Sixteen of the Mexicans were reported killed 
37
and scalped. Farther north, along the Smoley Hill and South 
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Platte. the Cheyennes pursued their methods of previous 
years. Great excitement prevailed in Denver, and Governor 
Hall of Colorado organized a volunteer company to protect 
38 
the stage lines. 
On September seventh, General Sheridan ordered SUlly to 
invade the region south of the Arkansas to make war on the 
families and stock oi' the Cheyennes and their allies. At 
nearly the same time, Colonel George A. Forsyth was ordered 
to operate against ·the Cheyennes in the vicinity of Fort 
Wallace. Forsyth headed an organization of frontier scouts 
which was formed on August twenty-fourth by authority of 
General Sheridan. "The formation of such companies was by
order of Congress, although that body refused to enlarge the 
39 
regular military establishment." The scouts were all exper-
ienced plainsmen and buffalo hunters who had been recruited 
40 
at Forts Harker and Wallace by Lieutenant Fred Beecher. 
Soouts had reported to Sheridan that a band of Indians, 
not exceeding two hundred fifty, was encamped on the western 
frontier of Kansas. The Indians attacked a wagon train near 
Sheridan on the Smoky Hill Route and fled northward. For-
syth'e company at once left Fort Wallace in pursuit of the 
raiders. After six days marching they camped on Arickaree 
Creek in North-eastern Colorado. On the morning of the 
seventeenth the camp was attacked by a large force of Chey-
ermes and Sioux. For six days the little band withstood 
both the warriors and slow starvation until rescued by
94. 
Colonel Carpenter and the Tenth Cavalry on September twenty-
41 
seoond. The confliot is generally known as the Battle of 
Beecher's Island in honor of Lieutenant Beecher. who died 
there. 
Numerous contradictory accounts have been written of 
this battle. Estimates of the number of Indians et1Bae;ed 
vary from four hundred fifty to two thousand, while statio-
tios on the number of Indian dead an~ wounded have rar)8ed 
over a similarly divergent soale. Forsyth nwnbered the In-
dians at-approximately four hundred fifty and reported thnt 
42 
at least thirty-five were killed and many more wounded. 
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Governor Crawford estimated the Indians at eight hundred. 
Newspaper aocounta of the battle stated thnt there wore from 
six hundred to seven hundred Indians well armed with Sponoer 
carbines and heavy rifles. stories written by part1o1~nnto 
in the battle differ considerably, although all agree that 
the Indian casualties were heavy. Tom Murphy. one of For-
syth's scouts, writing years afterwards, said that it was 
impossible to tell in the contusion of battle how many In-
dians fell. In 1870 Mr. Murphy met Phil MoCloskey, a trader 
to the Comanches, who had been with the Indians before and 
after the battle and had heard them discussing ~t. MoCloekey 
told JlU.rphy that three hundred sixty Indians were killed on 
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the Ariokaree. Another scout, Louie McLaughlin, believed 
that the Indian death rate must have been heavy, since 
sixty-eight Cheyenne bodies were found by Carpenter's troops 
on their way to rescue Forsyth. McLaughlin furthermore 
states that more Sioux than Cheyennes participated in the 
battle and that they lost more heavily than did their south-
45 
ern allies. The highest statistics encountered were printed 
in a l{ansae newspaper of comparatively recent times. This 
paper placed the number of Indians engaged in the battle at 
two thousand and estimated the dead at seven to eight hun-
46
dred. Standing alone against this ·arra7 of figures is 
George Bird Grinnell's account. Mr. Grinnell suggests that 
stories of the battle written by the white participants are 
oolored by their own imaginations. The Indian accounts to 
him are much more reliable. Aooord1ll8 to the Cheyenne ver-
sion, which Grinnell relates, there were about six hundred 
Indians in the battle and only nine killed. The Oheyennes 
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have even gone so far as to name the Indians who fell. 
While it seems almost impossible to decide between aucn 
conflicting statements, a bit of logic may help .solve the 
problem. Obviously the Indians must have numbered between 
tour hundred fifty and eight hundred. since moat.of the es-
timates range thereabouts. It is infringing upon a person's 
credulity to state that severa~ hundred .Indians fell in the 
conflict. Equally ridiculous is it to maintain that fifty 
sharp-shooting plainsmen, armed with seven shot repeaters 
oould kill only nine Indians in six days of battle and siege. 
As a consequence, until some better proof to the contrary 
can be furnished, the official report of Colonel Forsyth 
sounds most plausible. The chief value ot Forsyth's victory 
is that it broke up a large concentration of Indians which 
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otherwise might have done considerable damage to overland 
travel and the frontier settlements in Kansas, Nebraska and 
Colorado. 
While Forsyth and hie men were on the ma.rob toward the 
Ariokaree, preparations were being made in Kansas for a 
strong offensive against the Indian strongholds to the south. 
In order to invade the Indian Country with any sizeable 
force it was necessary to relieve many of the regulars who 
were engaged in patrol and soout duty. To meet this need, 
the First Frontier Battalion was organized trom the militia 
of Kansas. For some time Governor Crawford had been urging 
General Sheridan to aooept a battalion of militia for fron-
tier duty, but up to September eleventh hie offers had been 
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rejected. On September ninth Sheridan sent a long telegram 
to Crawford announcing Sully's movements south of the Arkan-
sas and once more refusing the militia battalion. Sheridan 
said that he was not yet convinoed that there was a neces-
sity for such troops, but that if he discovered his regulars 
were insufficient he would call upon Crawford for aid. In 
the meantime he asked that the people of Kansas have more 
patience and their Indian troubles would be settled perman-
ently. It was impossible, Sheridan added, to protect every 
house and person on the frontier. Small parties of whites 
who carelessly exposed themselves to danger would have to 
49 
take the consequences. 
Sheridan apparently changed his mind about the militia 
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battalion following fresh Indian disturbanoea.·since he fin-
ally acquiesced to Crawford's plan. On September eleventh 
the Governor had telegraphed Sheridan as follows: 
"Will you issue to me five hundred stand of 
Spenoer carbines with accoutrements and ammuni-
tion? If so, and you will supply rations, I 
will at onoe organize a battalion of picked men 
well mounted to guard the border from the Repub-
50
lioan to the Arkansas." 
Sheridan responded with his aooeptanoe, stating that Craw-
ford's proposition would enable him to use seven companies. 
51 · · 
ot regulars who had been patrolling the frontier. Adjutant 
General MoAfee on September fifteenth informed Governor 
Crawford that Sheridan would order the guns from Fort Leav-
enworth and sixty days rations from Fort Harker to be sent 
immediately to Salina, where the battalion was to organize. 
He added that Sheridan wanted the battalion in the field as 
soon as possible. since the seven companies of regular sol-
52 
diers were needed on the Plains at onoe. 
The next day, Governor Crawford issued his proclamation 
tor volunteers. Instructions were also telegraphed to re-
oruiting officers. Organization plans called for five com-
panies of cavalry to enlist for three months' service with 
possibilities of only sixty days' service required. Each 
recruit was expected to :furnish his own horse. Guns and 
ammunition were to be supplied by the United States through 
98. 
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General Sheridan. After assembling at Salina, the head-
quarters for arms, supplies, and enlistments, the oompanies 
were ordered to their respective stations. One company eaoh 
was stationed in the following localities: Lake Sibley, 
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Solomon Valley, Salina, Marion Center, and Topeka. The 
Topeka company was evidently held in reserve to reinforce 
the troops at other points. 
The period from September sixteenth to twenty-eighth 
was spent in preparation. Before the battalion was fully 
· recruited and outfitted, a call came from Sheridan to send 
the first company organized to the southwest frontier. Re-
ports had reached Sheridan that a war party of Cheyennes and 
fi5
Arapahoes had crossed the Arkansas east of the Great ~end. 
Shortly afterwards Crawford was notified by Sheridan that 
56 
the supposed Indian raid was a false report. On the twenty-
sixth Sheridan wired Crawford to relieve his troops on the 
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Saline and Republican as soon as possible. Two days later 
the first militia company marched away to the southwest. 
The others soon followed, and assumed their respective posi-
tions along the line of patrol. which extended trom Nebraska 
south to Wichita. Good.work was performed by this frontier 
patrol. No Indian depredations were committed during its 
sixty days of service except for one small raid on the Solo-
mon in which four men were killed, one wounded, and a woman 
taken ca~t1ve. 
After the sixty days' rations had been consumed, 
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AdJutnnt General McAfoe asked Sheridan if he wanted the bat-
talion disbanded. Sheridan ~eplied that he would ask au-
thority for more rations. Soon after, however, he left Fort 
Hays to take the field against the Indians. Upon referring 
the question to General Sherman, llcAfee re.cei ved a refusal;. 
consequently the Frontier Battalion was ordered home by
Colonel MoAfee in the latter part of November. Many of the 
soldiers were wholly destitute of winter clothing and both 
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horses and men were near starvation when mustered out. It 
was really unnecessary to keep the men in service any longer, 
ainoe by November the Indians had practically withdrawn from 
the State and Sheridan was carrying the war to the~ in a 
winter oampaign. Yany of the men in the battalion, however, 
seemed to think otherwise. On November twenty-sixth, Gover-
nor Green,· who had sucoeeded Crawford, reoeived a petition 
from members ot the battalion near Salina. Permission was 
asked of the Governor to retain one hundred men for a period 
or thirty more days with power to push tho enemy outside the 
State. The petition further requested that they be rationed 
b7 the State and allowed to retain their arms. The reason 
given for this desire to extend their time of service was 
that tour hundred Ohe7ennes and Arapahoes were encamped in 
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the Saline Valley. 
Colonel MaAfee, in order to fulfill this request, 
called upon the pogt adjutant at Fort Harker to issue more 
rations. That officer replied on December fourth with a 
re:tueel, stating that the issue of rations to state militia 
100. 
60 
was unauthorized and could not be oonplied with. Stato of-
ficials seemed willing to keep the militia out aa lons as 
the United states Government paid for the rations. When, on 
the other hand, the burden of rationing the troops tell to 
the lot of the state treasury, the Indian danger at onoe 
became negligible and the militia was withdrawn. 
It is extremely doubtful if the Indians reported on the 
Saline were Cheyennes and Arapahoes. It is even possible 
that there were no Indians in that region at the time. One 
month previous, Ma.Jor Jenness of the li'rontier Battalion hnd
reported that the only hostile Indians remaining in North-
western Kansas were the Sioux on the Republican River, all 
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Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands having gone into winter quarters. 
The last big Indian fight of the year in Kansas ooour-
red on October eighteenth, when Colonel Carpenter and the 
Tenth Cavalry exchanged blows with a large party of Chey-
ennes and Arapahoes near Buffalo Station sixty miles west of 
Fort Hays. Nine Indians were killed and thirty wounded. 
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Carpenter's losses were three wounded. On the next to the 
·last day.of October, Indians derailed six oars on a Kansas 
Pacific excursion train near Grinnell, but no one was hurt. 
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Colored troops charged on the Indians and drove them away. 
Sheridan's winter campaign against the Cheyennes had 
been foreehauowed on September eleventh, when he called upon 
Governor Crawford for the Frontier Eattalion. Shortly af-
terwards it we.s predicted by General Sherman in the following 
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prophetio statement: "When winter, starves their (the In-
dians') ponies, they will want a truce and shan't have it, 
unless the oivil influence compels me again as it did last 
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winter." General Sully's September campaign south of the 
.Arkansas had not euoceeded in crushing the Indians. In 
taot, SUlly himself was hard pressed before he managed to 
get baok to Fort Dodge. General Hazen at Fort Larned at-
tempted on September nineteenth and twentieth to come to 
terms with the Kiowas and Comanches; nevertheless he failed 
to seoure either peaoe or their removal to their reserva-
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tion. The Indians "worked" Hazen, as they previously had 
hoodwinked Sully, an~ obtained arms and ammunition with 
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whioh they promptly took the warpath. Continued Indian dep-
redations after Sheridan had ordered the Indians out of Kan-
sas exasperated the military authorities, Sherman finally 
authorizing Sheridan to proceed on a Winter offensive. 
On Ootober eighth, Sheridan informed Governor Crawford 
of his recent orders and called upon Kansas for a regiment 
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of volunteer cavalry to serve six months. The Indian Peace 
Commission having sustained the war policy, military prepar-
68 
ations could go ·forward without fear of interruption. J 
Sheridan's plans for the Kansas volunteers were that the 
cavalry should muster in Topeka and maroh overland to Camp 
Supply in Indian Territory, where they were to unite with 
.
Sheridan's forces from Forts Rays and,Dodge. Upon receipt 
of Sheridan's request, Governor Crawford immediately issued 
a proclamation calling for volunteers. 
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The response was instantaneous. Letters and telegrams 
came from all over the state offering services of ottioera 
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and men. On oc.tober twentieth, Company A was mustered in at 
Topeka. Other companies were rapidly added to the ranks 
until the regiment was complete. On November fourth, Gov-
ernor Crawford resigned hie office to take command ot the 
'10
expe.di tion. The next day the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry 
began the long trek across the Plains to meet Sheridan. The 
regiment reached Camp Supply on November twenty-sixth after 
sufferiDg great hardships. Freezing weather and laok of 
food killed many of their horses; consequently nearly half 
the regiment finished the campaign as infantry. Before the 
Nineteenth arrived, General Custer with his Seventh Cavalry 
had advanced southward to the Washita River and destroyed 
'11
Black Kettle's Cheyenne village. 
Custer's work on the Washita was but a part of the cam-
I 
paign plan of Sheridan. The entire plan called for the con-
certed operation of three separate columns of troo~s from 
Fort Hays, F~rt Lyon and Fort Bascom (New Mexico). Colonel 
Evans with six cavalry troops and two infantry companies was 
to leave Fort Bascom and work down the Canadian River. Gen-
eral Carr and seven troops of Fifth Cavalry were scheduled 
to march southeast from Fort Lyon to the North Canadian. 
Sheridan with the main force expected to strike the Indian 
villages along the Washita River. The three columns planned 
to converge and punish the Indians in a series of decisive 
engagements. The aims of the campaign were to force the 
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Indians on their reservations, and, if that failed, to show 
them that they would have no security winter or summer un-
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lees they respeoted the laws of peace and humanity. 
The Battle of the Washita has received so much public-
ity, that only the main facts of the affair need be told. 
On the morning of November twenty-seventh, after having fol-
lowed the trail of a returning war party, Custer's men sur-
rounded the sleeping village. At dawn the charge was sounded 
and the cavalry swept down upon the surprised Indians, 
driving them from their tepees. The Cheyennes never had a 
ohanoe and were badly beaten. Black Kettle, their chief, 
tell at the first onslaught. Custer's men destroyed the 
village and killed the captured pony herd. Unknown to 
Custer, the entire valley below the Cheyenne village was 
tull ot Indians--Arapahoee, Kiowas, and Comanches. These 
Indiana, hearing the sounds of battle, came to the rescue 
of their Cheyenne friends. Seeing such overwhelming numbers 
arriving, Custer very prudently withdrew and marched back to 
Camp Supply. statistics of the battle are greatly at var-
ianoe. In his report Custer stated that one hundred three 
warriors were killed and fifty-three women and children cap-
tured. The Indians themselves told General Grierson in 1869· 
that the Cheyenne loss was thirteen men, sixteen women, and 
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nine children. Custer's own losses were ninefaeen killed and 
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thirteen wounded. 
Mu.oh controversy has existed since the Washita battle 
104. 
as to whether or not Elack Kettle's band deserved what befell 
them. Sheridan himself thought that Black Kettle deserved 
what he got, since he had freely encouraged the Saline and 
Solomon raids, even tho12gh he did not personally participate 
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in them. In his report to the Secretary of War, Sheridan 
referred to the Cheyenne Chief in the follow1ll8 unoomplimen-
tary fashion: 
nBlaok Kettle ••• a worn-out and worthless old 
cypher, was said to be friendly; but when I sent 
him word to come to Dodge before any of the troops 
had commenced operations, saying that I would teed 
and protect himself and family, he refused ••• 
He was also with the band on Walnut Creek, where 
they made their medicine, or held their devilish 
incantations previous.to the party settil:18 out to 
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massacre the settlers." 
Other references to Black Kettle have been more kindly. 
Mr. Windom of Minnesota during debate in the House of Hepre-
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sentatives mentioned "Black Kettle and hie friendly band". 
George Bird Grinnell cites Black Kettle as a fine example ot 
a patriot and has eulogized him in these words: 
"ll1aok Kettle was a striking example of a oonsisi-
ently friendly Indian, who, because he was·rriend-
ly and because his whereabouts was usually known, 
was punished for the aots of people whom it was 
VB 
supposed he could control." 
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J. R. Mead. writing 1n the Wichita. Eagle many yea.rs e.fter. 
the battle, called the Washita affair a massacre of innocent 
Indians. The ,vriter deolared that Black Kettle was not a 
hostile and never had been, that General Hazen had given the 
Chief a letter guaranteeing him and his band protection,. and 
that when William Gritfenstein, a friendly trader and after-
wards mayor of Wichita, aooused Sheridan of striking a camp 
of friendly Indians he was ordered out of the Indian Terri-
. '19 
tory by Sheridan and threatened with hanging if he returned. 
The best statement on the mooted question had been 
ottered by George Bent. the half-breed Cheyenne. Bent said 
that Black Kettle himself was friendly, but that the Chey-
enne raiders on the Saline and Solomon Joined Black Kettle's 
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oamp making 1t appear as though the band were hostile. Lit-
tle Raven. an Arapahoe chief~ testified on April 9, 1869, 
before General Grierson that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes did 
not understand where their reservation was located. The 
Arapahoe chieftain thought Custer's attaclt was due to the 
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taot that the Indians were off their reservation. 
On December seventh, Sheridan's entire force left Camp 
supply and advanced to the Washita. Upon their approach the 
Indiana broke camp and fled, the Cheyennes and .Arapahoes 
retreating southward, while the Kiowas and Comanches headed 
for the Wichita Mountains. Sheridan followed the latter 
group after having thoroughly explored the site of the Wash-
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ita battle field. The expedition overtook the fleeing 
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Indians on.December se~enteenth near Fort Cobb. While ~re-
paring to strike the Kiowa village, Sheridan we.a stopped by
a message sent from Fort Cobb by General Hazen. The latter 
informed Sheridan that the Indians had surrendered to the 
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Interior Department and that they were not hostile. Onoe 
more the conflict of ~uthority between the War and Interior 
Depa~tmonts prevented deoisive military aotion. Sheridan 
was very angry at Hazen for interfering, because he believed 
84 
that the Kiowas richly deserved a severe trouncing. Hazen, 
of course, was acting under orders, since he bad been de-
tailed by both t~e War Department and the Indian Bureau to 
take charge of the arrangements for bring1Jl8 about peaoe and 
putting the Kiowa and Comanche Indians on their reservation. 
The difficulty was that Ha.zen•s and Sheridan's 1nstruot1ona 
were not in harmony. Hazen had regarded the Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes only as being hostile. He had therefore retused 
to allow them to come into Fort Cobb and make peaoe, al-
though Black Kettle and a delegation had appeared for that 
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purpose shortly before Custer's attack. 
Altho'U8h professing friendship, the wily Kiowas and 
Comanches endeavored to escape Sheridan and flee southward. 
By a bit of stratagem Sheridan prevented this and managed to 
accomplish a· complete surrender. Sheridan's method was 
quite simple but effective. It consisted of capturing Sa-
tanta and Lone Wolf, the princi~al Kiowa chiefs, and threat-
86 
ening to hang them. 
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The backbone of the Indian rebellion was broken on 
December t,venty ... :f'ifth, when Colonel h"vans completely oruahed 
the la.st hostile band of Comanches on ·the Canadian River. 
This had its effect upon the Cheyennes nnd Arapahoes who 
wore still at large. At midl1ight on December thirty-first, 
a delegation of chiefs from these tribes came into Fort Cobb 
begging :tor peace. They reported that their tribes were in 
mourning for their losses--their people starving-~poniea dy-
ing--doge all eaten u~--no buffalo. Sheridan accepted their 
unoonditional surrender and deo1ded to punish them Justly. 
"I can scarcely make error in any punishment'awa.rded. tor 
S'l 
all have blood upon their hands," he firmly asserted. 
The year thus ended with fair proe~ects of the Indian 
ware in Kansas coming to an end in the near future. In the 
meantime Governor Groen of Kansas had appealed to General 
SUlly to ~lace a permanent patrol of troops on the Saline 
and Solomon. Sully anawered by sending one hundred fifty 
regulars to the region and ~romised to keep men there in the 
88 
future. No outbreaks occurred in that seotion until the 
following spring. The close of the year found the Nine-
teenth Kansas Cavalry in good condition with forty-six of-
89 
tioers and one thousand one hundred twelve men on duty. 
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Part Two, 1869 
Throughout the winter months of the new year Sheridan's 
campaign continued. By the end of March the Indians had all 
been forced upon their reservations and the war was »raoti-
cally over so far .as the southern tribes were concerned. 
There still remained in Xansas the danger of depredations 
from the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne and Dog Soldier bands who 
usually spent part of each year huntins buffalo along the 
Smoky Hill and Republican. As a oonsequence, renewed out-
breaks occurred and Governor Harvey was compelled to follow 
the example of Crawford in calling out a militia battalion 
for frontier duty. Pawnees and Osages also gave some 
trouble. In general, though, the Indian raids did not oom-
pare in either duration or intensity with those of 1864-1868. 
Sheridan remained camped at Fort Cobb for several weeks 
after which he moved farther south to the Wichita Mountains. 
Near the latter he established Fort Sill. The Cheyennes had 
not remained true to their »eaoe pledge. Part ot them and 
nearl1 all of the Ara~ahoes gave themeelvea up. but Little 
Robe and the remainder of the tribe refused to come in. 
With this band were two captive white women, victims of the 
Saline-Solomon raids of the previous summer and autWIU1. 
Sheridan and Custer were especially anxious to recover these 
unfortunate captives. 
109. 
On l~roh 2, 1869, the lrineteenth Kansas and the Seventh 
Cavalry left Fort Sill under command of General Custer and 
Colonel 1Iorace L. Moore, who had succeeded Governor Crawford 
in February. The obJeot of the ex~edition was to recapture 
the captive women and foroe Little Robe's band into submis-
sion. After a terrific pursuit, the Cheyennes were over-
taken on March twentieth near the Staked Plains of Texas. 
Instead or destroyins the Indians, as oou1d have easily been 
done, Custer used diplomacy in order to recapture the women. 
By a repetition of Sheridan's "hang man" stunt. Custer 
frightened the chiefs into ordering the release of the women. 
Little Robe's band then surrendered and returned to Camp 
90 
Supply. 
This affair closed the winter campaign. General Sheri-
dan was called to Washington to beoome Commander of the Mil-
itary Division of the Missouri in place of Sherman, who had 
been appointed General-in-Chief of the United States Army 
upon Grant's vacating that office for the Presidency. In 
hie re~ort of the campaign, Sheridan was able to say that 
all obJeotives had been accomplished. This meant that pun-
ishmer1t had been inflicted. property destro1·ed, the Indians 
disabused of the idea that winter would briJ18 secui·ity, and 
all tribes south of the Platte forced upon their reserva-
91 
tions. 
When General Schofield succeeded Sheridan as Commander 
ot the Department ot the Missouri on Narch 20, 1869, the 
110. 
winter campaign had praotioally ended and the troops were 
92 
en route to their ordinary stations. The Nineteenth Kansas 
was ordered to Fort Hays on March thirty-first and mustered 
out April eighteenth. Only one man of the regiment was 
93
killed in servioe. 
Indian affairs were also fairly well settled. The 
Arapahoes were located at Camp Supply in complete submission. 
Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches were on their reservation. 
The Cheyennes had promised to make their submission in a 
short time. Dissension was rife in the ranks of the Chey-
ennes. The Dog Soldier bands under Tall Bull refused to 
make peace, wherea~ the maJority of the tribe he.d tasted 
enough of war and favored aooepting a reservation. As a 
oonsequenoe the tribe divided. Tall Bull and two hundred 
fifty warriors with their families Joining the Sioux and 
Northern Cheyennes on the Republican, while Little Robe and 
the greater part of the tribe remained in Indian Territory 
and were ultimately provided with a reservation in the vi-
94 
cinity of Camp Supply. 
Tall Bull and his cohorts on the Republican River were 
not content to let matters rest. On May twenty-first, Sioux 
and Cheyennes made a raid in Republic County killins thir-
95 
teen persons and taking two women and a child captive. on 
the twenty-ninth. Indians attacked the Kansas Paoifio Rail-
road near Fossil Creek. Two miles of track were torn up, a 
96 
train was ditched and traffic held up for nearly a day. The 
lllo 
next day the Saline Valley was a victim of a raid nearly 
identical to that of May twenty-first. Thirteen people were 
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killed and wounded and two more women were captured. 
General Custer immediately left Fort Hays in pursuit, 
but failed to oatoh the Indians. It remained for Ma.Jor-
Oeneral Carr to administer the final blow to Tall Bull's 
band. Carr with his Fifth Cavalry had been operating under 
General All8ur in the Platte Division of the Department of 
the Missouri. On July eleventh, Carr with seven companies 
ot cavalry and one hundred fifty Pawnee s~outs.under Ma.Jar 
North oompletely destroyed Tall Bull's village at Summit 
Sprinss, Colorado. Tall Bull was killed and his band nearly 
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annihilated. HeariDg of this, the Cheyennes in Indian Ter-
ritory hastened to Fort Supply to make peace. The remnants 
of Tall Bull's tribe drifted in later and begged for peace. 
As a result there were no hostile Indians on the Plains of 
99 
Kansas and Colorado. 
While the Nineteenth Kansas was pursuing Little Robe's 
band in Texas, Indian affairs in Kansas were not entirely 
quiet. In January General Sully warned Governor Harvey that 
hostile Indiana had recently been seen near Hays. Sully be-
lieved that the exposed settlers should be warned. He added 
that all of his spare cavalry was engaged in patrol duty on 
100 
the Saline and Solomon but that more had been applied for. 
Governor Harvey accordingly warned the settlements and or-
dered various frontiersmen to raise squads of scouts for 
112. 
defense. Colonel MoAfee hastened towards the frontier to 
101 
make arrangements tor supplying these eoouts with rations. 
Indians were reported in February on the Smoky Hill west of 
102 
Junction City. 
AdJutant General MoKeever of Fort Leavenworth on Febru-
ary twenty-seventh issued three thousand rounds ot ammuni-
tion to Governor Harvey tor distribution among frontier 
103 
settlers. 
The Kansas state Legislature took action in February 
and passed two measures for frontier proteotion. The first 
of these authorized the Governor to call into immediate 
active service not more than two hundred state militia to 
be stationed at the most exposed points. To meet the ex-
penses of this group of militia an act was passed providins 
for the issuance and sale of state bonds. Both of these 
acts were approved by Governor Harvey on February twenty-
104 
sixth. 
After the Indian raids of May and June, the militia was 
once more called into service. Four companies and a detaoh-
ment were mustered in during July and stationed on the 
northwestern frontier. The Second Frontier Battalion, as it 
was called, served until November twentieth, when the final 
muster-out occurred. Although originally organized with a 
roll of eleven officers and three hundred enlisted men, the 
number was gradually reduced as the Indian danger diminished. 
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Only one hundred fifteen remained at the final muster. The 
113-· 
four oompanies were located as follows: Company A at Spill-
man Creek; Saline Valley; Company Bat Plum Creek, Solomon 
Valley; Company Cat Fisher Creek, Solomon Valley; Company D 
at the forks ot Beaver Creek and Republican River. The 
troops patrolled the border line effect1vely1 but never came 
into aontaot with any large numbers of Indians. This was 
the last militia Battalion ever called out to defend the 
106 
Kansas frontier. 
Defore the organization of the Seoond Frontier Battal-
ion, AdJutant General Moorhouse called into service several 
oompanies of regular militia. These were ordered by Gover-
nor Harvey to cooperate with the United States Cavalry on 
the Solomon River following an Indian attack near Minneapol-
107 
1e in June. Light artillery from Fort Riley were also 
mounted and armed as cavalry at the request of the Governor •. 
108 
The artillerymen performed quite efficiently. 
Numerous complaints reached Governor Harvey concerning 
petty depredations of Pawnees, Otoes and Osages. One Junc-
tion City citizen wanted the "scalawag Pawnees and Otoes" to 
be warned to keep clear of all settlements during times of 
Indian hostility because all Indians looked alike to white 
men and many of these "friendlies" were being killed as a 
109 
result. Cowley County settlers petitioned Harvey to protect 
them from Osages who had driven off stock, burned a store, 
confiscated settlers claims, and in general acted quite ar-
110 
rogant to\vard the white man in the region. Osages were also 




In order to repay 1n a measure the Kansas settlers who 
had suffered at the hands of the Indians, the State Legisla-
ture in 1869 passed an act providing for a commission to 
investigate and.allow claims of citizens for damages done by
112 
Indians in 1867•8. The commission visited Ellsworth, Saline, 
Ottawa. Cloud, and Mitchell Counties and allowed a total ot 
one hundred twenty claims for an aggregate of 158,944.34. 
The.number of offenses charged to various Indian tribeo wore 
as follows: Cheyenne, seventy seven; Sioux, thirty-four; 
Pawnee, fifteen; Kiowa, nine; .Arapahoe, seven; Com.':lnohe, one. 
In its tour of investigation the commission found many 
claims abandoned and fields deserted. In oonoluding its 
report the commission urged that all Indian tribes be ex-
cluded from the State, adding that until such measures were 
taken there could be no permanent feeling of security on the 
113 
frontier. 
The claims audited by the commission were referred to 
Congress for final payment. lCs.nsas in addition carried on 
some relief work in cooperation with the United States Army. 
In February, General Sully rationed the destitute settlers 
of the Saline and Solomon regions and then informed Governor 
114 
Harvey of his investigations. General Sherman also sent an 
inspector to the locality who in turn reported to the Kansas 
governor. In this report, General N. H. Davis, Assistant 
115. 
Inspector General of the Department of the Missouri; an-
nounced that the Government hnd provided for· the immediate 
wants of the settlers by issuing food and clothing. The 
settlers, however, were in great need of seed wheat which 
the military authorities were unable to furnish; oonsequent-
115 
ly he appealed to Harvey to furnish it. As a result, the 
Kansas State Legislature on J!aroh first ~assed an act auth-
orizing the Governor to purchase and distribute ;16.000 
worth of seed wheat to the destitute frontier citizens. The 
oount1es affected by the act were Clay, Cloud, Ellsworth, 
Lincoln, Marioh, Mitchell, McPherson, Jewell, Ottawa, Re-
116 
publio, Saline, and Washington. 
War Department statistics for the years 1868-9 indicate 
that these two years wore the worst in the history of plains 
wa.rfnre in the Department of the Missouri. Indian depreda-
tions for tho period ran as follows: one hundred fifty 
eight people murdered; sixteen wounded; forty-one scalped; 
fourteen women outraged; one man, four women, and seven 
children captured; twenty-four houses attacked and burned; 
twelve stage coaches attacked and impeded; four wagon trains 
destroyed; eighteen Indians killed in these attacks. Sta-
tistios on conflicts between the Indians and the military 
were as follows: number of engagements. eleven; total num-
ber ot soldiers killed, thirty-five; total number of sol-
diers wounded, forty-nine; Indians killed, two hundred 
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ninety-one; Indians.wounded, two hundred fifty. With the 
116. 
close of this period the worst Indian troubles in Kansas had 
ended, although the years that followed broUBht their toll 
of death and destruction ~o the venturesome pioneers ot the 
Jayhawk State. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE INDIAN QUESTIOil IN COl:IGRESS AND IN KANSAS
From 1864 to 1870 few greater problems confront.ad 
. '
Conarese and the Executive Department than the complex In-
dian question. Both de»artments of g~vernment were torn by
oonflioting forces, one of which demanded that the Indian 
problem be settled by peaoetul methods while the other could 
see no solution except by the use of force. · In the Execu-
tive Department the conflict raged between two subsidiary 
divisions, the Department of the Interior and the War De-
partment. Administration of Indian affairs· v:as in the hands 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Interior Department, 
which had supervision over all Indian superintendents and 
agents, and authority to distribute annuities. 'Whenever 
Indian hostilities broke out, however, the war Department 
was compelled to intervene until they oould be put down. As 
a consequence, the autho~ity of the two departments over-
lapped and therefore clashed. Military programs were con-
stantly interfered with by the Indian Bureau with disastrous 
results both to the military and to the frontier settlements. 
On the other hand, the military people undoubtedly contrib-
uted to man:, unneoessary Indian ware. The war Department 
desired to regain the control· over Indian Affairs which it 
had exercised prior to 1841. The Indian Bureau for various 
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reasons, both selfish and otherwise, refused to be trans-
ferred. 
This inter-departmental war spread into Congress, where 
pressure was brought to bear by friends of the war Depart-
ment to bring about the proposed transfer. Congress divided 
on the question. Both Senate and House hotly debated the 
proposition at intervals over a period of several years, 
finally allowing the Interior Department to retain the In-
dian Bureau, In general the Senate favored the status quo, 
while the House constantly passed bills providing for chang-
ing the location of the Bureau. 
Public opinion entered the contest, the East as a rule 
upholding the policy ot the Indian Bureau while the West 
denounced it in the stroJJgest terms. Congressional legisla-
tion varied in accordance with changing situations, but on 
the whole it was tempered more by the peace party than by
the war party. In pursuance of its policy to make peace 
with the Indians, Congress in 1867 created a peace commis-
sion which attempted to settle the Indian problem on the 
Plains. No serious resistance, however. was offered to the 
War Department when, in 1868-9, it launched a decisive mili-
tary campaign against the Indians. 
The Indian Bureau in 1865 attempted to establish har-
mony with the war Department by a division of authority. 
Commissioner Cooley issued a circular to all superintendents 
and agents announcing that, in its relation with hostile 
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Indians, the Interior Department would subordinate its ac-
tions to the War Department. Agents, however, were instruct-
ed to perform their regular official duties in governing 
l 
friendly Indians. Had this policy been carried out as 
planned much trouble might have been avoided. 
The difficulty was that hostile Indians could seldom be 
distinguished from friendly Indians due to the fact that the 
Red Men were alternately warlike and peaceful. Thus in the 
Hancock War of 1861 the military authorities assumed that 
the Indians were hostile, whereas the Indian agents were 
positive of their friendliness. Indian Bureau officials 
were quite critical of Hancock and branded as a mistake his 
whole course ot action. Superintendent Thomas Murphy of the 
Central Superintendency at the time expressed a very decided 
wish that the military authorities would leave the management 
2
of Indian affairs to the Indian agents •. 
,Asain in 1868, trouble arose between the rival depart-
ments over the distribution of arms and ammunition to the 
Indians. Interior Department officials had authorized MaJor 
Wynooop to issue the guns and bullets to the eager braves on 
3
that fateful August day at Fort Larned. Soldiers hired by 
the War Department were then forced to face the Interior 
De~artment•s guns in the Indian campaigns which ensued as a 
result of the Saline-Solomon raids. 
After years of discord, the War Department and Interior 
Department finally worked out a cooperative Indian policy. 
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The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1869 announced that a 
perfect aocord had been reached. The Indian policy ot the 
future, as defined in the report, provided that: (l) The 
Indians should be secured in their legal rights. (2) When 
practicable they were to be located upon reservations, 
(3) They should be assisted in agricultural pursuits and the 
arts of civilized life. (4) All Indians who refused to oome 
into their reservations should be subJeot to control of the 
military authorities and should be treated as either friend-
4
ly or hostile as the situation demanded. The last point was 
espe_oially important, since it gave a definite basis tor 
determining the respective Jurisdiction of the two depart-
ments. 
Congress. in attempting to analyze the Indian problem, 
created in 1865 the Joint Special Committee on the Condition 
of the Indian Tribes. The purpose of the aot, as explained 
by its proponents when first introduced as Senate Resolution 
89, was to investigate the alleged oorruption of Indian 
agents and the alleged causing of unnecessary Indian wars by
5
military authorities. When.the bill went to the House it 
was amended by providing that the Indian Bureau at waehing-
6
ton should also be investigated by the committee. The two 
Rouses then appointed a conference committee to iron out 
their differences on the bill. The conference committee 
accepted the House amendment, after which both Houses adopt-
ed the report of the committee. President Lincoln signed 
the bill on llarah 3. 1865. 
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The Joint Special Committee was authorized to sit dur-
i?JB recess ot Congress and to report its findings to Con-
gress at its next session. The complete report of the 
committee was published in 1861. Its main decisions were: 
(1) The Indians are rapidly decreasing in numbers, due to 
disease, wars, cruel treatment by the whites, unwise govern-
mental policy and steady westward advance of the white man. 
(2) In a large maJority ot cases Indian wars are caused by
aggressions of lawless white men. (3) Loss of hunting grounds 
and destruction of game is a big cause for decay. (4) The 
Indian Bureau should remain in the Department of the Inter-
ior. (5) In order that abuses of Indian administration may 
be corrected the Indian lands should be divided into five 
inspeotion districts with a board of inspection in· each dis-
trict. The board would be empowered to oheok up on all 
questions of Indian administration and report at stated 
7
intervals to Congress. 
In order to put the ideas ot the committee into legis-
lation, Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, chairman of both the 
Joint Special Committee and the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, introduced Senate Bill 204 which provided for the 
I 
annual inspection of Indian Affairs by five inepeotion 
boards as heretofore mentioned. After long debate the bill 
passed the senate on March 19, 1866 by a vote of nineteen to 
8
sixteen. The House failed to take action on the bill until 
the following session when it amended by striking out the 
122. 
entire contents of the Senate bill and substituting the pro-
vision that the Indian Bureau should be transferred to the 
War Department. When the House amendment was returned to 
9
the Senate for concurrence it was decisively defeated. A 
deadlock ensued, for the breaking of which oonferenoe oom-
mittees were a:ppointed from both houses. The oonforanoe 
committee met but failed to agree, so asked to be discharged 
10 
from further consideration of the bill. 
The senate attitude throughout this contest was hostile 
to the proposal to transfer the Indian Bureau. During de-
bate on the House amendment, Senator Doolittle stated that 
the Committee on Indian Affairs of both senate and House and 
the Joint Special Committee on the Condition of the Indian 
Tribes were all unanimous in their desire to support the 
original bill, but were also unanimous in their desire to 
11 
defeat the House amendment. 
Congress' next attempt to carry out recommendations of 
the Joint Special Committee took place in the speoial ses-
sion of the Fortieth Congress in the summer of 1867. The 
seriousness of the Indian situation on the Plains at the 
time was one of the reasons for the calling of the special 
session. With the peace party dominant in both houses, leg-
islation was rushed through prov1d1IJ8 for the creation of a 
peace commission to make treaties with all the hostile 
tribes between the Mississippi and the Rookies. The func-
tions of the Peace Commission as stated in the aot of JU.l.y 
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20, 1867 were as follows: (l) To restore peace upon the 
Plaine. (2) To secure as far as possible the frontier set-
tlements and the unimpeded right of way for the Pao1f1o 
railroads. (3) To recommend a permanent Indian policy. 
The oommission aooordingly went to ,the Plains in the 
autumn of 1867 and concluded agreements with both the north-
12 . 
ern and southern plains Indians. The treaties in general 
oontained the three essential objeotives of the commission. 
In its report to Congress of January 7, 1868, the Peace 
Commission recommended the following changes in Indian pol-
icy: (1) Revision of laws governing relations ot the two 
raoee. (2) Indian affairs should not be transferred to the 
war Department. A temporary transfer to the war Department 
of Jurisdiotion over hostiles, however, was S1J8gested. (3) 
Congress should get rid of incompetent Indian officials. 
(4) A new department of Indian affairs should be created. 
(5) Territorial governors should treat the Indians more 
fairly. (6) No governor or legislature in either state or 
territory should be permitted to call out and equip troops 
for the purpose of carrying on war with the Indians. (7) 
Traders should all be required to receive permits from In-
dian Bureau officers in order to enter the Indian trade. 
(8) New provisions should be made which positively direct 
the military authorities to remove white persons who persist 
13 
in trespassing on Indian reservations. 
Efforts by the enemies of the Peace Commission to 
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dissolve it failed. On the day that Congress passed the aot 
creat~ng the commission, a bill was introduoed into the Sen-
ate for its dissolution. The Senate killed the bill by
14 
referring it to the Committee on Indian Affairs. Apparently 
Congress was in sympathy with the work of the Peaoe Commis-
sion, because a bill appropriating $150,000 to enable it to 
carry on its work passed in July, 1868, with little opposi-
15 
tion in either house. 
Numerous attempts were made to put through legislation 
which would bring about the transfer of the Indian Bureau to 
the war Department. The first of these arose in the Senate 
on May 16, 1866, when Senator Stewart of Nevada introduoed a 
bill for that purpose. It was referred to the Committee on 
16 
Indian Affairs and promptly lost. The second attempt was 
born the same year in the Senate in the form of an amendment 
to the annual Indian appropriation bill. Senator Sherman of 
Ohio, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and brother 
to General w. T. Sherman, introduoed the amendment to H. R. 
387. A great debate took place between Sherman and Stewart 
on the one side and Doolittle on the other. In the end 
Doolittle won out. and the Indian Bureau tor the time was 
saved from transfer. The Senate rejected Sherman's amend-
17 
ment by a twenty-one to twelve vote. The third and most 
dangerous attempt to bring about the transfer took place in 
1867 when the House of Repreeentatives amended Senate Bill 
18 
204 by inserting the well-known provision. 
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Not to be discouraged by reverses, the House in Decem-
ber, 1868, made another determined attempt to put across the 
transfer of the bureau. Garfield of Ohio, Chairman of the 
House Military Committee, introduced a_bill, H. R. 1482, for 
that purpose, and immediately called for the previous ques-
tion which passed, thus limiting debate on the main motion. 
Although Windom of Minnesota, a member of the House Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs, made a valiant fight against the bill, 
19 
he was outvoted 116 to 33. When the bill reached the Senate 
, 20
it was killed in the Committee on Indian Affairs. A final 
attempt tailed in the House in January, 1869, when Garfield's 
effort to amend an appropriation bill, by adding a section 
transferring the Indian Bureau to the War Department, was 
21 
ruled out of order. When the bill was sent to the senate 
for approval, Senator Stewart of Nevada amended it by adding 
a olauee identical to that offered by Garfield in the House. 
Stewart's amendment was lost by a 36-9 vote chiefly because 
22 
it was regarded as inappropriate at the time. 
This ended the efforts of the friends of the war 
Department. It is clearly apparent by the debate and voting 
on these various bills that the Senate consistently main-
tained its defense of the Indian Bureau, while the House 
gradually diminished its opposition to the bureau. Both 
houses desired an improvement in Indian relations, but could 
not become oonvinoed that the removal of the Indian Bureau 
from one department to another would appreciably improve the 
situation. 
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From beginning to end of the great oonteet over Indian 
policy, Kansas remained in the war party. Governor, state 
legislature, press and public opinion were united solidly in 
demanding a change in Indian administration. The Kansas 
delegation in Congress therefore was compelled to enter the 
fight on the side of their state. Kansas was represented in 
the House during the period by Sidney Clark of Lawrence, 
while Senators Pomeroy and Rosa championed the Sunflower 
State in the upper oham~er. Senator Lane's death in 1865 
occurred early in the struggle; consequently the ohief 
interest lies in the aotions and opinions of the other gen-
tlemen mentioned. 
Sena.tor Pomeroy in 1865 submitted a resolution in the 
Senate which provided: (l) That the Government change its 
magnanimous and conciliatory Indian policy and adopt vigor-
ous and decisive measures against hostile Indians. (2) 1~at 
the routes of communication to the Paoifio should be kept 
open. This resolution was referred to the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs on December 6, 1865. On July 27, 1866, 
the committee was discharged from further ooneideration of 
23 
the resolution. Later in the same session when the Senate 
was debating the House amendment to Senate Bill 204, ~omeroy 
opposed the transfer of the Indian ~ureau to the War Depart-
24 
ment. In the course of his speech he said that he was not 
prepared to turn out the army to exterminate the Indians; 
furthermore he believed that white men precipitated most 
127. 
25 
Indian wars. Whens. 204 was first presented in the Senate 
as a bill which represented the pet theories of the Joint 
Speoial Committee on the Condition ot the Indian Tribes, 
26 
both Pomeroy and Lane voted against it. On,the other hand, 
after the House had ohanged the entire content of the bill 
27 
by its amendment, ~omeroy voted against the bill as amended. 
In the special session of 1867, when Congress was con-
sidering Senate Hill 136 for organizing the Peace Commission, 
Pomeroy favored the proposition. While he believed it to be 
only a temporary measure, he thought it was to the interest 
28 
of the western country to secure peace. The following 
session saw Pomeroy introducing a bill to transfer the 
Indian Bureau to the War Department by allowing the Freed-
. 29 
man•s Bureau to assume the duties of the Indian Bureau. It 
is evident that Pomeroy had either changed his mind on the 
Indian question or that he was tryi?J8 to please his constit-
uency. The latter idea seems the more plausible. This is 
further carried out by the fact that the Kansas senator in 
1869 voted against Senator Stewart's proposition to transfer 
30
the Indian Bureau, and earlier in the session, introduced a 
bill to ~rovide tor the creation of a separate department of 
31 
Indian affairs. It is most probable that Pomeroy's personal 
opinion was unfavorable to the war party, but that his posi-
tion as a Senator from Kansas required him constantly to 
change his stand on the question. 
The position of senator Rose is not so difficult to 
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define. Ross wa.s a personal friend of Governor Crawford, 
received his appointment to the Senate from Crawford, and 
maintained a consistent attitude as ardent ndvooate of fron-
tier defense, and enemy of the Indian Bureau. Ross intro-
duced numerous resolutions of the Kansas State Legislature 
32 
into the Senate. It was Ross·to whom Governor Crawford 
turned on June 29, 1867, after General Sherman had reJeoted 
33 
hie offer of volunteer cavalry. Crawford poured out his 
bitter story in its entirety and appealed to nose to con-
vince CoI1gress that "there is no suoh thing as peaoe (with 
34
the Indians) except by war". In response to this appeal, 
Sena.tor Roes amended the Peace Commission bill by a provi-
sion that the army should accept the servioee of mounted 
volunteers from states and territories of the West in order 
36 
to suppress Indian hostilities. 
In defense of his amendment, Senator Ross argued that 
the Peace Commission bill made no provision for frontier 
defense, that Indian depredations were increasing, that 
Kansas sought merely permission to proteot herself, that the 
first duty ot the nation was to proteot the white raoe, and 
that war was the only method of bringing about ~eaoe with 
the Indian. Roes condemned both the F.asterner's view of the 
Indian as a hero and th~ Westerner's idea that the Indian 
was a devil incarnate. The conflic~ he sai~ was one between 
36 
oivilization and barbarism and that civilization must win. 
Senator Ross assumed a somewhat different position in a 
apeeoh at Lawrenoe, Kansas, on November 5, 1867. Although 
condemning the treaty system in general and the lled1oine 
Lodge Treaty in partioular, he did not advocate ma.kin& peace 
by means ot war. Instead he SU8gested that the best pos-
sible solution for the Indian problem was the gradual local-
ization of Indians upon reservations. To accomplish this 
end, the Senator stated, the Government must make a reason-
able show ot foroe. Military posts, he believed, should be 
inoreased both in number and size of garrison. 
t 
"After all," Senator Ross concluded, "it is not 
so muoh the manner in whioh the peace of the 
plains is to be secured, as the fact itself, in 
whioh the people ot Kansas are most interested. 
What we all most ardently desire, is the immun-
ity ot our trontiers from the disturbances and 
devastations which have eo effectually retarded 
37 
the settlement and development of the West." 
Again in 1869, Sena.tor Ross aided in the frontier 
defense of his state. In the autumn of the year. Indian .
depredations were renewed in Northwestern Kansas. Since the 
militia had been mustered out. Governor Haryey beoame_appre-
hensive for the safety of the settlers. Sena.tor Ross 
aooordingly was appealed to and secured the promise of Sher-
38 
man that United States troops would be sent to the region. 
Of the entire Kansas delegation in Co?Jgresa, Mr. Clarke 
maintained the moat consistent attitude. He never ohaJl8ed 
lZO. 
his position of antagonism toward the peace party. When an 
Indian appropriation bill was before the House in 1868 1 
Clarke opposed it on the grounds that it provided for making 
39 
appropriations to hostile tribes. On J5B.roh 3, 1868, he 
introduced a bill. H. R. 854, for the dissolution of the 
Peace Commission. The bill was reterred to the Indian Com-
40 
mittee but was never acted upon. 
In 1869 Clarke agreed heartily with Garfield's efforts 
to get the Indian Bureau into the War Department. He stated 
in debate that public opinion in the West was almost unani-
41 
moue in favor of the pro~osed transfer. In a lengthy epeeoh 
in support of Garfield's measure, Clarke expressed hie views 
plainly. The Indian question, he argued, was not a question 
of philanthropy, nor of laying the blame for agsresoion upon 
either whites or Indians. It was, however, he stated, a 
question of ~ractical administration. that aiv111zation had 
come into contact with the Indian but that civilization 
would march forward in spite of opposition. Re therefore 
wanted civilization aided instead or being hindered by
42 
Congress. 
Altholl8h the votes and speeches of the Kansas delega-
tion in Congress are a good indication of the Kansas atti-
tude toward the Indian question, a more thorough analysis 
can be obtained b7 turning to the state itself. Executive 
and legislative acts, :press comments, and individual opin-
ions best reflect what Kansas actually thought. 
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Previous ohapters in this monograph have disclosed the 
attitude of the governors of Kansas toward the entire Indian 
~roblem. Governor Crawford, who held the post of Chief 
Executive from 1866-1868 inclusively, had very decided opin-
ions. that may be swnma.rized as follows: (l) Every effort 
should be expended in defendiDB the State from Indians. 
(2) Indian uprisings should be put down by the use of mili-
tary force. (3) The wild tribes of Indians should be con-
quered and driven from the State. (4) Reservation Indians 
in Eastern Kansas should be removed to Indian Territory. 
(5) The Indian Bureau should be transferred from the Inter-
ior Department to the War Department~ (6) Indian traders 
and agents should not be allowed to sell arms and ammunition 
to the Indians. 
Crawford's suooesaor, Governor Harvey, entertained 
similar ideas. In hie message to the legislature in 1869 
Harvey advocated: the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the 
War Department; that Congress be urged to indemnify frontier 
settlers out of Indian annuities; that provision be ma.de for 
the organization of two regiments of volunteer militia for 
trontier service. 
The Kansas State Legislature gave both governors able 
support in their efforts to obtain :frontier protection and 
removal ot the Indians. In January, 1865, a Joint resolu-
tion passed both houses requesting the War Department to 
place a sufficient military force in the hands of General 
132. 
Curtis to enable him to give ample protection to the Kansas 
frontier and the Overland and Santa Fe routes. The resolu-
tion also ordered the Secretary of State to forward a copy 
of the resolutions to the legislatures of the states of 
Missouri, Iowa, Nevada, and California, and to the terri-
tories of Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Washington and Utah 
with the view of 1nduoill8 the legislatures of those states 
43 
and territories to take similar action. Thie resolution 
upon reaching Congress was referred in the Senate to the 
44 
.Committee on Indian Affairs, while in the House 1t was oon-
45
signed to the Committee on Military Affairs. 
In February, 1865, the Legislature adopted House Con-
current Resolution No. 20 whioh provided that Congress be 
urged immediately to order the construction of a telegraph 
line from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Lyons via Forts Riley, 
Zarah and Larned. The purpose of the proposed line was to 
enable United states troops and Kansas Militia to more 
easily locate a.nd punish Indian hostiles. The resolution 
further provided that the governor forward copies to the 
President of the United States. the Secretary of war, the 
Secretary of the I~terior. and each senator and repreaenta-
46 
tive in CoDgress. The proposed line was not built. 
In 1967 the Kansas State Legislature sent several oon-
ourrent resolutions to Congress in an effort to obtain 
greater frontier security. The most prominent of these was 
a resolution requestitl8 the Kansas delegation in Congress to 
133. 
urge u~on the Government the necessity of promptly estab-
lishing a military post or permanent ca.mp between Fort 
Kearney and Fort Harker. This resolution was tabled in the 
4'1
Senate on February 15, 186'1. thus practically killil'l8 it. 
The request for a military ~oat in this region v,as quite 
sensible and should have been granted, since Indian out-
breaks occurred more frequently alo!J8 the Solomon and Repub-
lican than in any other section of Kansas except the Smoky 
Hill Valley. 
Colonel J. H. Leavenworth, Indian Agent for the Com-
anohe and Kiowa tribes, was especially unpopular with the 
Kansas legislators; oonsequently they petitioned Co:ngress 
for his removal. The oomplete text of the resolution adopt-
ed on February 8 1 186'1, will best convey the opinion the 
legislature held concerning Mr. Leavenworth. 
"Whereas it has oome to the knowledge of the 
legislature of the State of Kansas that Colonel 
J. H. Leavenworth, present agent of certain hos-
tile tribes of Indians on the western and south-
western frontier of the State of Kansas, is 
wholly incompetent to perform the duties thereof; 
and whereas the settlers on said frontier are in 
imminent ~eril of their lives and property through 
said incompetency; and whereas, unless some com-
petent person be appointed in his stead friendly 
to the whites, with nerve to meet our present 
wants and emergency, our citizens will be butch-
ered, as heretofore in detail; 
Therefore, 
Resolved by the house of representatives (the 
senate concurring) That the said Congress, and 
especially our d.elegation therein, be earnestly 
requested to see that said Leavenworth be re-
moved, and a man substituted in his stead who 
will use his best and honest endeavors, while 
protecting the interests of the Indians, to 
48
save our citizens from slaughter." 
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Congress failed to heed this petition also, so Mr. Leaven-
worth continued in offioe. 
The legislative session of 1869 not only sent many 
appeals to Congress for frontier protection, but passed a 
large quantity of state laws on the subJect. The Kansas 
delegation, in Congress was instructed to use its efforts to 
secure the passage of an act of Congress to enable the 
adJustment and payment by the United States ot claims of 
Kansas citizens. The claims in question were for damages 
inflicted by Ara:pahoe, Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche Indians 
49
in 1864. Another resolution urged Congress and the General 
Government to make a speedy appropriation for the relief of 
Kansas citizens who had been victims of Indian depredations 
50
from 1861-9. Both of these resolutions were referred to the 
Committee on Indian Affairs in the Senate but failed to 
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emerge. Coll8rees was also memorialized to transfer the 
Indian Bureau to the War Department, Mr. Clarke of Xansas 
presenti?l8 to the House ot Representatives the concurrent 
61 
resolution of the State Legislature. 
Legislative measures for frontier protection passed 
during the 1869 session dealt chiefly with the financing of 
military expeditions of 1868. An aot was passed providiDB 
tor the issuance and sale of fl4.000 in state bonds to 
defray the expenses incurred by the raising of the Nine-
52 
teenth Kansas Cavalry. Another aot of similar nature pro-
vided for the issuance of ~76,000 in state bonds for payment 
of all other military indebtedness of 1868. Especially did 
this apply to the expenses of raising and maintainins the 
53 
First Frontier Battalion. For future protection of the 
frontier the legislature ordered that $100,000 of state 
64 
bonds be issued and sold to provide a state military fund. 
In the session of 18?0 the legislature again sent a 
memorial to Congress the main points of which were an appeal 
to the Government to prevent a repetition of the Indian out-
rages on Kansas settlers and a protest against any reduction 
55 
of the United States Army. 
In reading through the files of Kansas newspapers for 
the period, one is impressed by the unmistakable attitude of 
antagonism which the press maintained toward the Indian, the 
Indian traders and agents, and the Indian policy of the 
United states Government. Several representative articles 
136. 
chosen from a variety of newspapers will indicate what the 
Kansas papers thought on the Indian question. One editor 
during the Civil War demanded the complete extermination or 
56 
the Plains Indians. Others approved heartily of Colonel 
57 
Chivington's method of dealing with them. In 1866 when 
MaJor General Cloud was oontemplating a campaign against the 
Indians with Kansas militia, the Junction c1t1 Union com-
mented in the following way: 
"If the General has any oompunotions of oon-
soienoe in regard to 'playing Sand Creek' upon 
them (the Indians) he had better not start. It 
is so unfortunate for the settlements that so 
many asses have existed as to make suoh a tre-
mendous howl, in the interests of thieving 
agents, because of the Sand Creek wh1pp1ne;. 
Had the effect of that not been spoiled, Indians 
58 
would have been effectually subdued for years." 
Followill8 some sarcastic comments about Indians indulging in 
their "little innocent pastime of ecalpiDB" another editor 
took a hard oraok at the United States military poets. The 
posts, he declared, were of no protection whatever to trav-
elers or settlers and that "The only purpose aubserved by
these ornamental appendages to the Government seems to be 
59 
the consumption of poor commissary whiskey." 
Epithets applied to the Indians by newspapers were 
numerous. They varied from the slightly saroaetio references 
13'1. 
to "the noble rod man" and "Lo, the Poor Indian" to the more 
emphatio appelations of "red devils" "hell hounds", and 
"eons of the Devil". Even the reservation Indians in the 
eaotern part of the state were not exempt. A very amusing 
yet oontem»tuous opinion of the Kaw Indians is reproduced 
below. 
"Wo have not seen the dusky forms of the noble 
red men of the Kaw persuasuon about our streets 
in the laat two or three ~aye. Doubtless those 
sweet soented ones that ware encamped near here 
hnve gone back to their reservation. When we 
oonaidor how effiaient they were in 'gobbling 
up' the putrescent animal and vegetable matter 
about the city, we almost regret their departure. 
Now that these scavengers are gone, our 
oity fathers should look to it that some other 
means be employed to guard the health of our 
60 
people." 
Oocnsionally a Kansas paper took the part of the Indian. 
The Y.nnsae state Record in 1868 deplored tb.e :f'act that 
people persisted 1n getting up rumors or an Indian war when 
there was no occasion for it. The editor admitted th.at more 
thnn hnlf of the Ind1s.n outrages were cau.aed in the first 
61 
place by \vronga done to the Indian by the white man. The 
same editor later in the year denied that the ma.Jority of 
62 
Indian wars were caused by the whites. Then a few days
138. 
later, after riding on a train in the company ot Colonel 
Wyncoop, Indian agent at Fort Larned, the editor published 
an artiole in which he coincided with Wynooop•s views. 
Wynooop had said that the military never punish the guilty 
Indians but wreak their vengeance on the innocent; also that 
every treaty made by the United States with the Indians was 
63 
first broken by the whites. 
Indian agents received their share of abuse at the 
hands of the press. Colonel Leavenworth, of course, was the 
principal target at which these literary shafts were aimed. 
A newspaper correspondent writing i'rom Fort Harker on July
10, 1867• handed the following bouquet to the Colonel: 
"• •• the Indians evidently having either gone 
North; or to the vicinity of Colonel Leavenworth's 
headquarters, there to receive those presents that 
tender hearted functionary has recently obtained 
from the Government for distribution among the Lo 
family. It is the earnest wish of every person 
in this section, so far as I can ascertain, that 
the Indians immediately after receiving their 
presents from Leavenworth, will return the com-
64 
pliment by lifting his hair." 
The Junction Citz Union, in speaking of John Smith, an 
Indian trader, was almost incoherent with rage because the 
said Smith hobnobbed with Congressional committees, professed 
139. 
horror at any proposal to punish the Indians, yet grew rich 
by stealing from both the Government and Indians. The 
article advised the Government to get rid of its thieving 
agents, interpreters and hangers-on if it intended to solve 
65 
the Indian question. 
Kansas editors especially resented the attitude of the 
eastern press toward the people of their state. A common 
accusation of eastern newspapers was that the people ~f 
Kansas desired an Indian War for the sake of the contracts 
and profits which would accrue to the locality in which 
military expeditions were organized and outfitted. This was 
66 
constantly denied with vehemence by the Kansas press. When 
a st. Louis paper, !a! Missouri Republican, quoted General. 
Sherman as saying that parties in Kansas wanted an Indian 
war, the Leavenworth Conservative immediately published a .
statement which not only denied the truth of the accusation 
67 
but doubted that Sherman ever said it. Following the Saline-
Solomon raids ot 1868 a Topeka Journal expressed the views 
of Kansas in these words: 
"We hope that Easterners will learn that Kansas 
oitizens are not thieves, ·constantly striving 
for an Indian war for the purpose of speculation; 
but that the frontier settlers are constantly in 
the presence of a great daJJger so long as the 




Kansas in general ridiculed the easterner's ideas on 
the Indian question. "Maudlin sentimentaliste"--"Eastern 
philanthropists"--"Indian Worshippers" and other similar 
epithets were hurled back at those people in the East who 
advanced solutions for the great raoial problem. An eastern 
proposal to withdraw troops from the Plains 1n the fall of 
69 
1866 was regarded as absurd. Horace Greeley's plan for 
putting the Indian to work raising cattle and sheep on the 
Plains was hailed with glee by a quick-witted Kansas editor 
who observed that it was about as practical as goiJ28 to the 
VO
moon in a balloon. 
Whenever the Indian Bureau received mention in a Kansas 
paper it was only in the most scathing terms. The Leaven• 
worth Daily Conservative at one time desor1bed the "Indian 
Offioe" as being nothill8 but a great buying and sellill8 
agency which paid tribute to barbarism to compensate for 
?l 
damages done by civilization. The same paper again alluded 
to the bureau as a reproach and a disgrace to the nation and
72 
stated that the country looked upon it· as a den of robbers. 
The Conservative had previousl7 adhered to the belief that 
the Indian Bureau should·be transferred to the war Depart-
-
ment, but in 1867, when a suggestion had been made in Wash-
ington to make the bureau an independent department, the 
Leavenworth paper approved. Especially did the Conservative 
welcome that part of the new plan which proposed consigning 
the wild Indians to the war Department while the Indian 
141. 
Department supervised the civilized tribes. "By all odds 
let the War Department have the uncivilized Indians," it 
'13
shoutod. 
When the Indian Bureau in 1868 declared that Kansans 
were greatly exaggerating reports of Indian raids the Kansas 
State Record rose in anger and wrathfully retorted: 
"The Indian Bureau will believe nothing 'till 
they obtain. through miles of red tape a month 
later, an of:f'1o1al report. We only hope that 
Governor Crawford will put himself at the head 
of a band of' our western men, follow the Indians 
to their homes, and do his work!. 1! Chivipgton. 
If he does he must be sure to keep out of the 
way of the u. s. officials; or, if necessary, 
'14
fight them." 
U];>on hearing of the Senate confirmation of Mr. Bog:, as Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs the Junction pitl Union vented 
its opinion of the man. Among other things he was referred 
to as "one of the most skulking and cowardly rebels of all 
wretches ot the olass who ever cursed Missouri with the evil 
75 
ot their wicked lives". 
The Kansas press was especially belligerent toward the 
peace party in Coll8rese who endeavored to settle the Indian 
troubles by treaty instead of by force. The Kansas Dailz 
Tribune advocated a short residence upon the Plains with the 
142. 
loss of a scalp as a sure oure for the romantic ideas which 
United States Senators and Congressmen had formed in regard 
76
to "·the dirty red devils". The White Cloud Chief, in refer-
ence to General Connor 1 s destruotion of an .Arapahoe village, 
feared that Connor would "go overboard", since a "sniffling 
Congressional Investigating Committee will shortly be after 
him to examine into and report upon this fiendish piece of 
'17
barbarism". 
While a special session of Congress in the summer of 
186'1 debated the question of sending a peace commission to 
the Plains, the newspapers in Kansas were ridiouli.D8 its 
efforts. The way to make peaoe, aooording to one editor, 
was by notifying the Indians that no more treaties would be 
78 
made and then removing the red men to reservations. 
Throughout the period spent by the Peaoe Commission in Kan-
sas in 186'1, the Leavenworth Conservative printed saroaetio 
articles most of whioh applied the term "Fu.11 Moon Exeroioes" 
to the Treaty of Medicine Lodge. 
Miscellaneous remarks of Kansas papers.are worthy ot 
note. The report of the Joint Congressional Committee on 
the Condition of the Indian Tribas was met by a storm of 
protest. 11!! Atchison Daily.£!.!! Press thought the report 
would "wonderfully please the worshippers of the noble red 
man in the east", but doubted it it would find favor with 
the frontier people who were acquainted with the facts in 
'19
the case. The Junction City Union once went so far as to 
143. 
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declare that all treaty makers should be killed by Indiana. 
To sum up the attitude of the newspapers of Kansas a· 
representative selection is quoted from one of the leading 
Journals: 
"With our routes of travel closed; with our 
borders beleaguered by thousands of these merci-
less devils whose natures are compounded of 
every essential diabolism of hell ••• we pre-
sent to the o1v111zed world a pioture of weak-
ness nnd vacillation, deliberately saor1ficill8 
men and women, one of whose lives is worth more 
than the existence of all the Indians in Amer-
Bl 
ion." 
Lest it be thought that a few newspaper editors were 
dictating the thinking of the people of Kansas, it is well 
to cite opinions of the frontiersmen themselves. Citizens 
ot Marion County first circulated a petition for the removal 
of Colonel Leavenworth. The petition was then endorsed by 
82 
Governor Crawford and sent to the Secretary of the Interior. 
Opinions expressed by the frontiersmen concerning the In-
dians and Indian polioy, while leas polished, were Just as 
toroefu.l as ~hose of newspaper editors. One illiterate 
frontiersman, in writing to Governor Crawford, made refer-
ence to the "read devvels". Others thought that the Govern-
83 
ment was in league with the Indians to destroy the settlers. 
The maJority of the letters sent to the Kansas gove~nors 
144. 
expressed hatred and f~ar of the Indians, horror at the In-
dian Bureau1 s policy of arming the red men, and disgust at 
the peace-treaty-ma.king, present-giving system employed by
the Government. 
Another expression of the people's attitude was the 
resolution adopted by the Republican state Convention at 
Topeka. on September 9, 1868. 
"We demand, in the name of our :r1,ontier settlers, 
that the uncivilized Indians be driven from the 
State, and the civilized tribes be speedily re-
84
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